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Mental representations of unknown others play a central role in person perception. These 
representations, informed by our memories as well as the affective associations we acquire 
though our past experiences, heavily influence how we perceive, evaluate, and react to new 
people we encounter in our day-to-day lives. Three papers aim to understand the antecedents and 
consequences of these representations at different stages of relationship formation and 
functioning—from evaluating unknown others to getting acquainted with these individuals. The 
first paper focused on idiosyncratic cues pertaining to representations of significant others and 
showed that women evaluated unknown men who resembled their partner (vs. those who did not) 
more favorably, even when they were not consciously aware of the idiosyncratic cue. In 
everyday person perception, such idiosyncratic cues are encountered simultaneously with cues 
shared across perceivers. The second paper provided the first systematic examination of how 
resemblance to known others (an idiosyncratic cue) and facial width-to-height ratio (a shared 
cue) simultaneously influence person perception. Shared and idiosyncratic cues had additive 
effects when participants made evaluative judgments (i.e., snap judgments of liking). Across 
three studies, facial width-to-height ratio was negatively related to liking. However, this 
association was significantly attenuated for women with a wide-faced romantic partner. The 
idiosyncratic cue predicted liking only when novel faces resembled newly encountered people 
who engaged in blameworthy behaviors or when they resembled significant others. Shared and 
idiosyncratic cues interacted to influence processing efficiency when participants made 
 categorical judgments (i.e., indicated whether unknown faces resembled someone they knew). 
Participants made slower and less accurate responses to wider faces resembling a liked known 
other (vs. not). By focusing on static photographs of faces, these studies showed that shared and 
idiosyncratic cues profoundly influence person perception. The third paper complements this 
research by showing that likeability judgments from photographs predicted likeability judgments 
following live interactions, even when judgments were separated by two weeks and when 
interactions provided more opportunities to learn about the person. Drawing from theorizing on 
mental representations, the present research sheds light on the multitude of factors that influence 
everyday person perception from photographs to live interactions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: REPRESENTATIONS OF UNKNOWN OTHERS 
Upon meeting an unknown other, we seldom take in the information about this person in 
an unbiased manner but use our existing knowledge about the world and people in general to 
make sense of him or her. This knowledge is based on mental representations of unknown 
others—our mental image of how a trustworthy, dominant, intelligent, etc. person looks like and 
acts. These mental representations, informed by our memories as well as the affective 
associations we acquire though our past experiences, heavily influence how we perceive, 
evaluate, and react to new people we encounter in our day-to-day lives. 
How can we have representations of “unknown others”—people we never met? Our 
existing representations of known others, members of social groups, and various physical cues 
are what inform representations of unknown others. Through our past experiences with people 
that we know (e.g., parents, family members, peers, partners), we learn that certain physical 
features and behaviors are indicative of certain traits (e.g., Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; Verosky & 
Todorov, 2010; Todorov & Uleman, 2002). These idiosyncratic representations are 
complemented by representations shared by some or many members of our social group. For 
instance, information learned through media and cultural teachings (e.g., Weisbuch & Pauker, 
2011) contribute to how we mentally represent people from certain social categories (e.g., 
Whites, Blacks, Asians). Moreover, facial features that resemble stimuli that have adaptive 
significance—such as happy expressions and babies—are represented more favorably in our 
minds (e.g., Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). Altogether, these idiosyncratic and shared 
representations define how we mentally represent unknown others and guide our first 
impressions upon meeting a new person. The relative importance of each representation in 
impression formation depends on the characteristics of the person, the context he or she is 
encountered, and how accessible each representation is.  
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What is the evidence that we have representations of unknown others? 
The past decade has witnessed an increase in cross-disciplinary work spanning from 
cognitive and social psychology to psychophysics using tools such as reaction times measures, 
reverse correlation techniques, and computer models to understand how we mentally represent 
unknown others. Extant evidence on first impressions strongly suggests that individuals already 
have preconceptions about physical characteristics and behaviors that signal particular traits in an 
unknown other. For example, upon learning about a person’s behavior, perceivers tend to 
spontaneously infer traits (e.g., Todorov & Uleman, 2002; 2003; 2004), suggesting that 
individuals already have extensive knowledge about behaviors signaling certain traits. 
Importantly, learning about an unknown other’s behaviors leads to neural activation in areas 
implicated in person perception (i.e., amygdala and posterior cingulate cortex) only when these 
behaviors are consistent (vs. inconsistent) with subsequent impressions of this person (Schiller, 
Freeman, Mitchell, Uleman, & Phelps, 2009). This provides evidence that perceivers are not 
taking into account all incoming social information while forming impressions but rather 
weighting pieces of information according to existing representations of unknown others.  
In addition to representing behaviors signaling certain traits, perceivers also have visual 
representations of how, for example, a trustworthy or a dominant person looks like. Todorov and 
colleagues used perceivers’ ratings of randomly generated faces to construct computer models 
revealing how a trustworthy or a dominant face is represented by most perceivers (Oosterhof & 
Todorov, 2008). In other work utilizing reverse correlation techniques, they superimposed 
different patterns of random noise on an average face and asked participants in a forced choice 
task which of the two faces has a certain trait—such as trustworthiness or dominance (Dotsch & 
Todorov, 2011). By averaging across the patterns of noise belonging to those faces selected by 
participants as more trustworthy or dominant, they revealed how perceivers represent a 
trustworthy or a dominant face, respectively. Moreover, Willis and Todorov (2006) showed 
considerable agreement among perceivers about judgments of faces on traits such as 
trustworthiness and aggressiveness (Cronbach alphas ranging between .85 and .97). These 
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judgments, made under no time constraints, were significantly associated with snap judgments 
made in less than a fraction of a second, suggesting that representations of unknown others can 
be activated and applied to a new person automatically.  
Although this work seems to suggest that representations of unknown others are largely 
shared across perceivers, other work (e.g., Hönekopp, 2006) revealed that methods such as 
Cronbach’s alpha overestimate how much perceivers agree on their judgments. Specifically, 
when the number of perceivers is large—as in a typical psychology study—agreement across 
perceivers may seem very high even when the intercorrelations between perceivers’ judgments 
are small. To be able to estimate the role of idiosyncratic and shared influences on judgments, 
Hönekopp (2006) asked participants to repeatedly rate the same set of faces on attractiveness. 
Results showed that idiosyncratic taste and shared taste accounted for roughly equal variance in 
judgments of attractiveness. Although whether the same holds for other judgments—such as 
trustworthiness and dominance—remains to be tested, this work suggests that idiosyncratic 
aspects of mental representations of unknown others are as prominent as their shared aspects. 
Shared and idiosyncratic representations inform how we represent unknown others 
Mental representations that contribute to how we represent unknown others lie on a 
continuum in the degree to which they are idiosyncratic (i.e., in the eye of the beholder) or 
shared across perceivers. The more a mental representation is shaped by unique past experiences, 
the closer it is to the idiosyncratic end of the continuum. For instance, experiences one has with a 
romantic partner are often unique so representations of romantic partners will likely vary from 
perceiver to perceiver. Although there are shared aspects of partner representations—for 
example, individuals in a satisfied relationship tend to idealize their partner (e.g., Gagne & 
Lydon, 2004)—past work by Andersen and colleagues reveals that idiosyncrasies of these 
representations often outweigh their shared aspects. This work revealed that mental 
representations of significant others can be activated by cues pertaining to one’s own but not 
someone else’s significant other (e.g., Andersen & Baum, 1994; Kraus & Chen, 2010), 
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suggesting that the representation of a specific significant other—such as one’s romantic 
partner—are largely idiosyncratic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Examples of idiosyncratic and shared representations that inform representations of 
unknown others.  The examples lie on a continuum based on the degree to which they are 
idiosyncratic vs. shared across perceivers. An important factor determining the relative 
idiosyncrasy of a representation is the extent to which perceivers are exposed to similar 
experiences during the formation of the representation. 
To the extent that perceivers go through similar experiences while forming mental 
representations, these representations move away from the idiosyncratic end of the continuum 
and closer to the shared end. For instance, compared with the representation of one’s romantic 
partner, one’s introduction to psychology professor is likely to be represented similarly across a 
greater number of perceivers—those students who take the professor’s class will form relatively 
more similar—albeit not identical—representations of the professor assuming that they are 
sufficiently motivated to attend to psychological and physical characteristics of the professor 
during the lectures (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987). As 
the number of perceivers exposed to common knowledge about a given individual—such as a 
celebrity (e.g., Tanner & Maeng, 2012)—or groups of individuals—such as members of 
stereotyped groups (e.g., Weisbuch, Pauker, & Ambady, 2009)—increases, the representations 
Idiosyncratic 
representations 
Shared 
representations Fewer      Shared Experiences          Greater 
• 
Representation of 
one’s romantic 
partner 
• 
Representation 
of facial width-
to-height ratio 
Representations 
of emotional 
expressions 
• 
Representation 
of a specific 
professor 
• 
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are likely to be less idiosyncratic and more shared. One source of shared knowledge is 
information transmitted through the media. A rather dramatic demonstration of how media 
disseminates information about and thus shapes representations of stereotyped groups is 
provided by Weisbuch and colleagues (2009), who demonstrated that nonverbal behaviors 
toward African-Americans (vs. Whites) were more negative in popular TV shows. Importantly, 
exposing participants to TV shows featuring such nonverbal bias (vs. not) led to less favorable 
implicit evaluations of African-Americans. This reveals that the extent to which perceivers are 
exposed to similar experiences about a social category is a key factor determining how similar 
the representation of that social category is across perceivers. 
Another example of the ways by which perceivers may go through similar experiences 
while constructing a mental representation is if they repeatedly observe different individuals with 
a particular facial feature engage in similar behaviors. Research showed that men with wider (vs. 
narrower) faces are more likely to engage in untrustworthy behaviors—such as cheating and 
deception (Haselhuhn & Wong, 2012)—and to display aggressive behaviors—such as shoving 
an opponent during a sports game (Carre & McCormick, 2008). With exposure to men with 
wider faces exhibiting aggressive and untrustworthy behaviors, individuals might be learning 
that facial width-to-height ratio (WHR) is a reliable signal of male trustworthiness and 
aggression (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010). Indeed, both Chinese and Caucasian perceivers judge men 
with wider (vs. narrower) faces as more aggressive (Carre, McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009; 
Short, Mondloch, McCormick, Carre, Ma, Fu, & Lee, 2011), revealing that facial WHR might be 
one of the cues underlying the agreement on who is aggressive. Moreover, research by Stirrat 
and Perrett (2010) provided evidence that this cue is linked to judgments of trustworthiness. 
Specifically, participants were presented with a wider and a narrower version of the same male 
face and were asked to select the face that looked more trustworthy. Results revealed that 58% of 
the participants more often selected the narrower faces as more trustworthy, suggesting that 
perceivers display some agreement in how they represent facial WHR. 
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Representations that are assumed to be shared across the greatest number of different 
individuals pertain to cues with adaptive significance—such as basic emotions and babies—
given these cues elicit similar responses from perceivers across the globe (e.g., Zebrowitz & 
Montepare, 2008), some cross-cultural differences notwithstanding (e.g., Mesquita & Frijda, 
1992). For example, facial features resembling a happy expression are evaluated more favorably 
than features resembling a fearful or disgusted expression (e.g., Said, Sebe, & Todorov, 2009). 
Similarly, facial features resembling babies (vs. not) lead to more favorable evaluations (e.g., 
Zebrowitz, Fellous, Mignault, & Andreoletti, 2003). Moreover, research by Zebrowitz, 
Montepare, and Lee (1993) provided evidence that there is agreement across cultural groups in 
judgments of faces on babyfacedness and on traits related to babyfacedness—such as warmth, 
naiveté, honesty, submissiveness. Specifically, White, Black, and Korean participants’ mean trait 
judgments for each face were highly correlated (correlations ranging between .61 and .87). 
Importantly, the size of these correlations were significantly diminished controlling for perceived 
babyfacedness of faces, supporting the idea that agreement across cultural groups in trait 
judgments can be partially accounted by representations of babyish features. Face-space models 
that reveal shared characteristics of prototypical trustworthy or dominant faces provide 
converging evidence that representations of emotional expressions and babies contribute to how 
we mentally represent unknown others (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Specifically, exaggerating 
facial features of the prototypical trustworthy face results in a happy (vs. angry) expression 
whereas doing the same for the prototypical dominant face results in mature (vs. babyish) 
features. Overall, this work suggests that representations pertaining to babyish features and 
emotional expressions can account for some of the shared aspects of mental representations of 
unknown others.  
Idiosyncratic influences on shared representations 
Conceptualizing mental representations as a function of the similarity of perceivers’ 
experiences reveals that even representations that are thought to be shared across different 
perceivers are susceptible to change through idiosyncratic experiences. These might be 
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idiosyncratic personal or cultural experiences (e.g., Medin, Bennis, & Chandler, 2010; Weisbuch 
& Pauker, 2011) as well as differential exposure to information conveyed through the media 
(e.g., Weisbuch et al., 2009). Indeed, research shows that repeatedly having favorable 
experiences with members of stereotyped groups (e.g., Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, & Tropp, 
2008) or pairing them with positive concepts (e.g., Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 
2011) leads to more favorable evaluations of these groups. This research suggests that even 
representations which are thought to be shared are amenable to change with repeated exposure to 
contradicting information. However, no studies so far have looked at whether representations of 
facial cues shared across perceivers—such as facial WHR, babyish features, or resemblance to 
emotional expressions—can be altered by idiosyncratic experiences.  
What determines which representations get activated at any given moment? 
An important factor contributing to which mental representations get activated and 
applied to a new person is characteristics of this person. If the person has facial or psychological 
features resembling a known other or members of a particular social category, the representation 
of the specific known other or the social category will be activated and used to make sense of the 
person. Alternatively, perceiving a cue associated with a certain trait (e.g., a greater WHR, 
resemblance to a happy expression, babyish features) can activate the representation of that cue 
and the category of people who possess that cue. Another factor contributing to which mental 
representations get activated is the context in which the person is encountered. For example, 
representation of the social category black is more likely to be activated when a black person is 
encountered in an all-white group than in a mixed group (e.g., Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & 
Ruderman, 1978). Of course, some representations are constantly on the tip of our minds—i.e., 
chronically accessible—compared with others. These representations require very little input 
from the environment to be activated and might even color perceptions of a new person in the 
absence of any cues pertaining to this representation. For example, research by Andersen and 
colleagues (Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1995) showed that perceivers still attributed 
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some characteristics of a significant other to a new person even when this person did not share 
any characteristics with the significant other. 
Overview of the empirical chapters 
Mental representations of unknown others play a central role in person perception. 
However, the antecedents and consequences of these representations at different stages of 
relationship formation and functioning—from evaluating unknown others to getting acquainted 
with these individuals—are yet to be fully understood. For example, does objective facial 
resemblance to significant others color impressions about unknown others? How does this 
idiosyncratic facial cue influence person perception when it is simultaneously processed with a 
shared facial cue? To what extent do evaluations of others based on static photographs of faces 
predict evaluations following live interactions? The present studies aim to address these 
questions.  
Chapter 2 (published in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology; Günaydin, 
Zayas, Selcuk, & Hazan, 2012) focuses on idiosyncratic cues pertaining to representations of 
romantic partners and investigates whether novel faces resembling one’s own romantic partner 
(vs. another participants’ partner) are judged more favorably, even when perceivers are not 
consciously aware of the idiosyncratic cue. In day-to-day person perception, such idiosyncratic 
cues are encountered simultaneously with cues that are shared across perceivers. Thus, Chapter 3 
investigates in three studies how resemblance to various known others (an idiosyncratic cue) and 
facial WHR (a shared cue) simultaneously influence person perception. In addition, research 
described in Chapter 3 is the first examining whether the effect of shared cues can be altered by 
idiosyncratic experiences. Specifically, this research investigates whether having a romantic 
partner with a wider face can attenuate the negative association between facial WHR and 
trustworthiness.  
Research on first impressions speaking to mental representations of unknown others has 
predominantly focused on static photographs of faces. Whether judgments based on photographs 
are significantly associated with judgments following face-to-face interactions is yet to be 
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empirically tested. A significant association between judgments based on photographs and those 
following live interactions would suggest that both types of judgments are informed by similar 
cues pertaining to facial appearance. Chapter 4 addresses this possibility in two studies 
investigating whether participants’ evaluation of unknown individuals based on photographs 
predicts their judgments after interacting face to face with these individuals, even when the 
interaction provides opportunities to get to know the other person. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses 
directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
I LIKE YOU BUT I DON’T KNOW WHY: OBJECTIVE FACIAL RESEMBLANCE TO 
SIGNIFICANT OTHERS INFLUENCES SNAP JUDGMENTS 
When a new person shares attributes with a significant other (SO), the mental 
representation of the SO is spontaneously activated, and is used to evaluate the new person—a 
phenomenon referred to as transference (Andersen & Chen, 2002). In the original transference 
work (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990), participants who read written 
descriptors of a new person sharing some attributes with a SO evaluated this new person 
favorably and in ways consistent with the SO representation.  
But, often the first information we receive about a new person isn’t a written descriptor, 
but a snapshot of their physical appearance. To date only two studies (Kraus & Chen, 2010; 
White & Shapiro, 1987) have investigated whether perceived facial resemblance between a SO 
and an unknown other triggers transference. Both studies consisted of a “stimulus selection 
phase” in which participants identified from a collection of photographs individuals who bore 
high resemblance to a previously named SO. Later, at an ostensibly unrelated “test phase,” 
participants evaluated a new person who either resembled a SO (i.e., an individual they had 
identified in the selection phase) or a yoked participant’s SO. Participants who learned about a 
new person who resembled a SO (compared to a yoked participant’s SO) evaluated the new 
person more positively, described themselves in ways consistent to when they are with the SO, 
and inferred that the new person possessed attributes similar to the SO (Kraus & Chen, 2010; 
White & Shapiro, 1987). 
Although this work provides compelling evidence that perceived facial resemblance 
between a new person and a SO can lead to facially-triggered transference, it does not speak to 
whether objective facial resemblance does; both studies relied on subjective methods to create 
facial similarity. Because subjective judgments about facial resemblance do not necessarily 
reflect objective resemblance, past work leaves open the possibility that participants’ choices at 
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the selection phase were not determined merely by facial similarity to the SO but by other factors 
as well. For example, individuals tend to view close others more positively (e.g., Gagne & 
Lydon, 2004; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996) and as more attractive (Epley & Whitchurch, 
2008), than they actually are. Thus, when participants in past studies were instructed to evaluate 
the novel faces based on their physical resemblance to the SO at the selection phase, they may 
have been motivated to select novel persons whom appeared to possess desirable attributes, 
including attractiveness, even though there may not have been objective facial resemblance. As a 
result, later evaluations could have been driven by liking and inferences at the selection phase, 
rather than activation of the specific SO representation at the test phase. Thus, manipulating 
objective resemblance would provide stronger evidence for facially-triggered transference. This 
is a primary aim of the present study. 
The fact that past work has relied on subjective reports of facial resemblance is also 
relevant to our second aim. According to the theory, transference effects should occur without 
conscious awareness (e.g., Andersen, Reznik, & Glassman, 2005). Support for this proposition 
has been obtained by presenting written descriptors of the new person outside of conscious 
awareness (Glassman & Andersen, 1999). It is less clear, however, whether the same is true for 
facially-triggered transference, especially in situations in which the face is consciously 
perceived, even though the facial resemblance to the SO is not (e.g., Bauer, 1984; Tranel & 
Damasio, 1985). Past work did not directly ask participants at the test phase whether the new 
person resembled someone whom they knew, but used general probes of suspicion, which may 
not have adequately captured subjective awareness. So it is still not known whether facial 
similarity between the new person and the SO can lead to transference in the absence of 
awareness of the resemblance. If it can occur without awareness, it would not be amenable to 
conscious control (e.g., Debner & Jacoby, 1994: Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001). This 
would provide strong evidence for the automaticity of facially-triggered transference effects. 
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Present Research 
Does objective resemblance between a novel person and a SO lead to facially-triggered 
transference? If so, can facially-triggered transference occur without awareness of the 
resemblance? To address these questions, we recruited romantic couples and took their 
photographs in an initial session. We used morphing techniques to digitally combine the 
photographs of the partner with photographs of unknown others, creating twelve novel faces all 
of which resembled the partner. In this way, we objectively manipulated each novel person’s 
facial resemblance to partners and eliminated potential confounds (e.g., selection biases) that 
may have been present in previous work. 
In an ostensibly separate study, we assessed facially-triggered transference. To minimize 
participants’ awareness of the resemblance and to assess more automatic processes, we 
developed a unique method for assessing transference, which significantly departs from 
previously used methods. Specifically, we used a within-subjects design in which participants 
made a total of 144 snap judgments about 24 unknown others, 12 of which resembled the 
partner. Each novel face was presented for only 500 ms (e.g., Willis & Todorov, 2006) and 
evaluated on six traits (e.g., trustworthy). Given that individuals automatically evaluate partners 
positively (e.g., Zayas & Shoda, 2005), we predicted that novel faces resembling the partner (vs. 
not) would be judged as more likely to possess positive traits—evidence of facially-triggered 
transference. 
Because our claim is that facially-triggered transference arises from activating the 
specific SO representation, we aimed to provide evidence against a familiarity account (e.g., 
Zajonc, 1968, 1980). That is, transference effects may arise as a result of exposing individuals to 
familiar targets and this feeling of familiarity (rather than activating the specific SO 
representation) may elicit positive evaluations. By recruiting couples who had been together for 
at least one year, we essentially controlled for familiarity across couples—i.e., all couples should 
be well exposed to their partners after one year. Therefore, if facially-triggered transference 
arises from activating the specific representation, then individuals highly satisfied in their 
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relationships, who have more positive representations of their partner (e.g., Murray et al., 1996; 
Zayas & Shoda, 2005), should evaluate novel faces resembling the partner (vs. those who do not) 
more positively (e.g., Andersen & Baum, 1991). 
To investigate whether facially-triggered transference can occur in the absence of 
awareness, we directly assessed participants’ awareness of the resemblance using both subjective 
and objective methods, which tap different aspects of consciousness (Cheesman & Merikle, 
1984; Wiens, 2007). Specifically, participants indicated whether the novel faces reminded them 
of anyone whom they knew (subjective awareness) and discriminated between faces that 
resembled the partner vs. those that did not in a forced-choice task (objective awareness). 
Lastly, we explored whether transference effects would vary by gender. Although past 
work on transference has not reported gender differences (e.g., Kraus & Chen, 2010), the present 
methodology employs a subtler manipulation of facial resemblance—by using morphing 
techniques and by presenting each photograph for 500 ms. Given that women are more 
perceptive of subtle facial cues (e.g., McBain, Norton, & Chen, 2009), they might respond more 
strongly to subtle cues of facial resemblance—leading to gender differences in facially-triggered 
transference. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty heterosexual couples (Mean age=21 years, SD=2.82; relationship length=12-132 
months) participated in the study. One couple withdrew from the study and one male 
participant’s data were lost, leaving 57 participants. 
Measures and Procedure 
In session-1, participants completed the Perceived Relationship Quality Components 
Inventory-short form (Fletcher, Simpson, & Thomas, 2000) using a 7-point (Not at all to 
Extremely) scale (α=.79, M=6.13, SD=.64). Participants then posed for a headshot (hair pulled 
back, jewelry/glasses removed) with a neutral expression. 
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Figure 2.1. Example of the morphing procedure used to digitally combine 50% of the partner’s 
photograph with 50% of the photograph of a same sex target to produce a novel face resembling 
the partner (“partner-similar”) (a), facially-triggered transference, reflected by mean A′aggregate, 
and the tendency to judge partner-similar faces as possessing a particular trait, reflected by mean 
A′s for individual traits, for women and men separately (b). The morphing procedure described 
in panel (a) was repeated 12 times, morphing the partner’s photograph with 12 different same-
sex faces. This procedure was also used to produce the yoked-similar faces, which served as 
control stimuli; the yoked participant’s partner’s face was morphed 12 times, each with one of 12 
a 
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different same-sex faces. In panel (b), A' is a sensitivity measure adjusted for response bias. The 
bolded line marking A' at .5 reflects chance responding—i.e., no tendency to judge partner-
similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces as possessing the trait. An A′ significantly greater than .5 
indicates a tendency to judge partner-similar faces as possessing the trait (i.e., accepting, 
aggressive, attractive, intelligent, supporting, trustworthy). A′aggregate—reflecting the transference 
effect—was derived by reverse scoring aggressiveness, and computing the mean A' for the six 
trait judgments. Bars marked with an “*” are significantly (p<.05) higher than .5. Bars marked 
with an “a” indicate that women’s A′ values are significantly (p<.05) higher than men’s A′ 
values. Error bars represent 1 standard error ± the mean.  
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To create stimuli, we paired couples and created yoked pairs between same-sex 
participants. We morphed the partner’s photograph with each of 12 of 24 same-sex faces 
compiled from databases (Tottenham et al., 2009; Minear & Park, 2004) to create 12 “partner-
similar” faces (50% partner’s face+50% same-sex face; see Figure 2.1). Similarly, we morphed 
the yoked participant’s partner’s face with each of the remaining faces to create 12 “yoked-
similar” faces. Because each yoked pair saw the same faces, peculiarities in stimuli were 
controlled entirely. 
In session-2 (2-4 weeks after session-1), participants made snap judgments of each novel 
face (12 partner-similar, 12 yoked-similar) on six traits (accepting, aggressive, attractive, 
intelligent, supporting, trustworthy). Each trial consisted of a fixation cross (1000 ms), a face 
(500 ms), and a question (e.g., Is this person trustworthy?), which remained on the screen until 
participants indicated “yes” or “no” by pressing “D” or “K.” Response keys (“yes” on left vs. 
right) were counterbalanced across participants. Trials were randomly presented except that the 
same face or the same trait question did not appear on consecutive trials. 
After the snap judgment task, as a measure of subjective awareness of the resemblance, 
participants reported whether the novel faces resembled anyone whom they knew, and if yes, 
whom the faces resembled. We identified those participants who reported that one or more of the 
faces reminded them of their partner as subjectively aware. After debriefing, a subset of 
participants (N=46; 24 females) completed an objective awareness task identical to the snap 
judgment task except that participants indicated whether each face resembled their partner or not. 
To index the extent to which participants judged partner-similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces 
as possessing a trait, we computed A′ (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) for each of the six trait 
judgments. A′ reflects the extent to which an individual discriminates between two options while 
taking into account response biases. It is conceptually similar to examining proportion of trials in 
which partner-similar faces were judged to possess a trait (relative to yoked-similar faces). An A′ 
of .5 reflects chance responding, and an A′ significantly greater than .5 reflects the tendency to 
judge partner-similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces as possessing a trait. We averaged all six A′s 
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(reverse scoring A′aggressiveness) to index facially-triggered transference (A′aggregate; α=.88). An 
A′aggregate significantly greater than .5 indicates a tendency to evaluate partner-similar faces more 
positively than yoked-similar faces. We also computed sensitivity to discriminate partner-similar 
from yoked-similar faces in the objective awareness task (A′awareness). We adjusted for 
interdependency among data points arising from the nested data using linear mixed models (see 
Section S1 in Supplementary Material available online for methodological details). 
Results and Discussion 
The present study showed that objective resemblance to the SO—created by morphing 
the SO’s photograph with unknown faces—can give rise to facially-triggered transference, as 
reflected by an A′aggregate that was above chance (t(28.22)=2.95, p<.01, d=.55). This effect, 
however, was qualified by participant’s sex (t(27.99)=2.83, p<.01, d=.75). Whereas women 
judged partner-similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces more positively (t(52.38)=4.11, p<.001, d=.87), 
men did not (t<1, d=.12). Given that the novel faces were presented for only 500 ms, the findings 
suggest that facial resemblance to a SO can be processed efficiently from subtle cues, and still 
influence judgments about others automatically, spontaneously, and effortlessly. Importantly, 
relationship quality1
The results support the idea that resemblance to a SO can affect snap judgments of 
unknown others without awareness. In other words, facially-triggered transference occurred for 
women even when the 14 participants (9 females) who expressed subjective awareness of the 
resemblance (t(40.95)=3.23, p<.01, d=.81) were excluded from the analyses, and even when 
statistically controlling for objective awareness (t(22)=3.67, p<.01, d=.96; see Section S2 in 
, for both men and women, was related to more positive snap judgments of 
partner-similar faces (t(42.07)=2.09, p<.05). The fact that individuals highly satisfied in their 
relationships, who have more positive partner representations, evaluated novel faces that 
resembled the partner more positively, suggests that facially-triggered transference arises from 
activating the specific SO representation rather than familiarity. 
                                                          
1 Relationship quality did not significantly vary by gender (t<1). 
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Supplementary Material available online for additional analyses). These results are consistent 
with research showing that individuals can display implicit memory for familiar faces without 
explicit memory (e.g., Bauer, 1984; Tranel & Damasio, 1985). 
One of the novel findings of the present research is that women showed facially-triggered 
transference to a greater extent than men. Although gender differences in transference effects are 
uncommon, the present findings are consistent with other work showing that women, compared 
to men, are more sensitive to subtle facial (e.g., McBain et al., 2009) and relational cues (e.g., 
Cross & Madson, 1997), and process visual information more thoroughly (Guillem & Mograss, 
2005). Women’s detailed elaboration of visual content might lead them to give more weight to 
subtle cues of resemblance with a SO, whereas men might lend more weight to their prior 
knowledge about the facial characteristics of a trustworthy person (e.g., Meyers-Levy & 
Maheswaran, 1991). Although speculative, the fact that the present study observed sex 
differences while previous work (e.g., Kraus & Chen, 2010) did not suggests that making the 
resemblance more salient—by using subjective methods to create resemblance and providing an 
indefinite amount of time to view the photograph—was necessary for producing transference 
effects in men; women, on the other hand, could detect even subtle cues of facial resemblance 
and use those cues in person perception.  
A major strength of the present study is utilizing a within-subjects design assessing snap 
judgments of 24 different novel persons, 12 of which resembled the partner and 12 that did not. 
Compared to past work that has relied on between-subjects designs in which participants viewed 
one photograph of either a person who resembled the SO or someone who did not, the use of 
multiple stimuli in the present study makes it unlikely that an idiosyncratic feature of the 
partner’s face, or of the novel face, is driving the effects, increasing the validity and 
generalizability of the current findings (e.g., Fiedler, 2011). Moreover, the use of morphing 
techniques to manipulate facial resemblance circumvents potential confounds (e.g., selection 
biases at the stimulus selection phase). Thus, it provides a stronger test of the hypothesis that 
facial resemblance to the SO can influence judgments automatically and without awareness. 
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The present findings support the claim that facial resemblance of a novel other (with a 
SO) can activate the SO representation, which in turn leads to more favorable snap judgments of 
the novel person. Alternatively, could the effects have emerged in the absence of activating the 
specific partner representation? Because individuals may like their partner’s facial features, 
exposure to the partner-similar features, rather than the activation of the specific partner 
representation, might have elicited more positive evaluations. Research and theorizing about face 
recognition suggests that this is unlikely. Seeing facial features or exceedingly different poses of 
a known other spontaneously activates abstract knowledge about that particular person as 
reflected by activation of neural regions involved in spontaneous retrieval of person knowledge 
and emotional responses (e.g., Gobbini & Haxby, 2007; Quiroga et al, 2005). In the same 
manner, partner-similar facial features should activate the partner representation. Future work 
should obtain direct evidence, however, by assessing the transference of attributes associated 
with the specific SO representation. 
By systematically manipulating objective resemblance using morphing techniques, the 
present research is the first to quantify facial resemblance and to show that objective facial 
resemblance to a SO influences snap judgments of novel persons in the absence of conscious 
awareness of the resemblance. Moreover, facially-triggered transference appears to arise from 
activating the specific SO representation rather than familiarity. These findings are consistent 
with extensive research showing dissociations between implicit vs. explicit memory, and indicate 
that facially-triggered transference can influence person perception spontaneously and 
automatically. 
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Supplementary Material 
S1 Methodological Details 
Participants 
The sample was 80% Caucasian, 16.7% Asian or Asian American, and 3.3% from other 
ethnic backgrounds. All but six of the yoked pairs were matched on ethnicity. Results excluding 
the unmatched pairs did not differ substantially from those reported here. 
None of the participants had distinctive facial hair or markings. 
Measures and Procedures 
Assessing Facially-Triggered Transference using A′. We indexed the extent to which 
participants were likely to judge partner-similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces as possessing a trait by 
computing A′. Partner-similar faces were assigned as the “signal” and yoked-similar faces were 
assigned as the “noise.” For example, partner-similar faces were counted as a “hit” if they were 
judged as trustworthy. Accordingly, yoked-similar faces were counted as a “false alarm” if they 
were judged as trustworthy. Using the hit and false alarm rates, we calculated A′ scores 
(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) for each of the six traits (i.e., trustworthy, supportive, intelligent, 
attractive, accepting, aggressiveness). Chance responding (i.e., no tendency to judge partner-
similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces as more likely to possess a trait) is indexed by an A′ of .5. An A′ 
significantly (p<.05) greater than .5 indicates a tendency to evaluate partner-similar faces as 
more likely to possess the trait than yoked-similar faces. Finally, we averaged all six A′s (after 
reverse scoring A′aggressiveness) to index facially-triggered transference (A′aggregate; α=.88). An 
A′aggregate significantly (p<.05) greater than .5 indicates a tendency to evaluate partner-similar 
faces more positively than yoked-similar faces. 
Additional Information on Data Analysis. We first paired couples (henceforth called 
“dyads”) and formed “couple pairs.” We then created yoked pairs between same-sex participants. 
Because data points for each participant were nested within dyads, which were further nested 
within couple pairs, we used linear mixed models (LMMs) to account for interdependency 
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among data points. Dyad and couple pair were included in the model as random variables and 
sex was included as a fixed variable. 
We ran separate LMMs for A′aggregate and A′ scores for each of the six traits. We obtained 
the mean estimates for A′ from the LMMs, therefore, statistically controlled for the nested 
design. We conducted one-sample t-tests on these estimates, comparing each to the chance level 
of .5 (see Table 2.1). LMMs in SPSS use Satterthwaite’s (1946) approximation to estimate the 
degrees of freedom associated with the intercept and slopes, resulting in non-integer degrees of 
freedom. 
S2 Additional Analyses 
Calculating Effect Sizes 
There is no established method of calculating effect sizes for complex non-independent 
designs such as the LMMs used in the present study (Klein, 2004). However, to give the reader a 
general sense of the magnitude of the effects, we calculated the effect size in units of residual 
variation, estimated by the full model. Our estimate of effect size is equivalent to Cohen’s d, 
except that we used the residual standard deviation. Specifically, we estimated the effect size 
using the following formulas: 
For comparing a sample mean to chance: d=(Estimated mean-0.5)/SDres 
For comparing two sample means: d=(Estimated mean1-Estimated mean2)/SDres 
where SDres is the residual standard deviation—i.e. the square root of the error variance. 
Assessing Facially-Triggered Transference in the Absence of Awareness of the 
Resemblance 
Subjective awareness. Subjective methods of awareness indicated that 14 participants (9 
female) expressed awareness of the resemblance between the novel faces and their partner. For 
these participants, facially-triggered transference, as reflected by A′aggregate, was .61, compared to 
.56 for those who did not. When we entered subjective awareness as a factor in the model 
(0=awareness; 1=no awareness) predicting A′aggregate, neither the main effect of subjective 
awareness nor its interaction with sex was statistically significant (ts<1). Critically, when we 
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excluded participants who expressed subjective awareness, A′aggregate remained significantly 
above chance for women (M=.62, t(40.95)=3.23, p<.01) and at chance for men (M=.50, t<1) (see 
Table 2.2). 
Objective awareness. A subset of participants (n=46) completed a measure of objective 
awareness that reflects the sensitivity to consciously discriminate partner-similar faces from 
yoked-similar faces, indexed by A'awareness. Objective awareness was above chance for both 
women (M=.84; t(45)=9.28, p<.001, d=1.89) and men (M=.80; t(45)=7.99, p<.001, d=1.67), and 
did not significantly differ (t<1) between the genders. We included A'awareness and its interaction 
with sex in LMMs (along with dyad, couple pair, and sex). The interaction between sex and 
A'awareness was statistically significant (b=.62, t(40.17)=2.34, p<.05), which indicated that 
objective awareness was related to A′aggregate for women (b=.69, t(22)=3.49, p<.01), but not for 
men (t<1). A′aggregate was also stronger for women than for men (t(39.48)=1.96, p=.06). 
Because the relation between awareness (A'awareness) and transference effects (A'aggregate) 
varied for men and women, we ran two separate LMMs, one for women and one for men, to 
statistically control for A'awareness. One-sample t-tests were performed using the estimated means 
and standard errors to compare the means to chance (.5). A′aggregate remained significantly above 
chance for women (M=.61, t(22)=3.67, p=.001) and at chance for men (M=.52, t<1), after 
controlling for A'awareness. We followed the data analytic techniques described above to 
investigate facially-triggered transference for each individual trait while statistically controlling 
for objective awareness (see Table 2.3). 
Finally, participants who expressed subjective awareness performed significantly (p<.05) 
better on the measure of objective awareness (A′awareness=.92) than those who did not (M=.78). 
However, when participants who expressed awareness were excluded from the analyses, the 
results controlling for A'awareness did not differ substantially from those reported in Table 2.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables 
Table 2.1.  Tendency to judge partner-similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces as possessing a particular trait, reflected by mean A′ scores for 
each of the six trait judgments and their aggregate (i.e., facially-triggered transference), for women and men. 
  Women's A'  Men's A'  
Women's A' 
compared to 
men's 
 Mean SE t p  Mean SE t p  t p 
Trustworthy 0.66 0.04 4.23 0.0003  0.49 0.04 -0.27 0.7877  3.88 0.0006 
Supportive 0.65 0.04 3.91 0.0003  0.55 0.04 1.19 0.2412  2.33 0.0275 
Intelligent 0.64 0.04 3.70 0.0005  0.49 0.04 -0.31 0.7574  3.31 0.0026 
Attractive 0.64 0.04 3.41 0.0012  0.58 0.04 1.91 0.0621  1.09 0.2854 
Accepting 0.60 0.04 2.35 0.0223  0.52 0.04 0.45 0.6558  1.33 0.1893 
Aggressive 0.45 0.04 -1.44 0.1551  0.52 0.04 0.62 0.5409  -1.45 0.1530 
Aggregatea 0.62 0.03 4.11 0.0001  0.52 0.03 0.54 0.5895  2.83 0.0085 
N = 57. 
Notes. A' is a sensitivity measure adjusted for response bias. An A' of .5 reflects chance responding. An A' significantly greater than .5 
reflects the tendency to judge partner-similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces as possessing the trait. P-values indicate the probability that A' 
was significantly greater than .5. aAggregate—reflecting the facially-triggered transference effect—was computed by reverse scoring 
aggressiveness, and computing the mean A' for the six trait judgments. 
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Table 2.2. Tendency to judge partner-similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces as possessing a particular trait, reflected by mean A′ scores for 
each of the six trait judgments and their aggregate (i.e., facially-triggered transference), for women and men, including only 
participants who did not express subjective awareness of the resemblance. 
  Women's A'  Men's A'   
Women's A' 
compared to 
men's 
 Mean SE t p  Mean SE t p  t p 
Trustworthy 0.67 0.05 3.62 0.0011  0.46 0.05 -0.94 0.3549  3.54 0.0016 
Supportive 0.65 0.05 2.96 0.0051  0.56 0.05 1.37 0.1790  1.45 0.1636 
Intelligent 0.61 0.05 2.27 0.0288  0.47 0.04 -0.61 0.5423  2.25 0.0331 
Attractive 0.63 0.05 2.44 0.0193  0.56 0.05 1.26 0.2166  0.93 0.3602 
Accepting 0.64 0.05 2.72 0.0095  0.51 0.05 0.20 0.8432  1.90 0.0711 
Aggressive 0.45 0.04 -1.23 0.2241  0.55 0.04 1.26 0.2157  -1.76 0.0858 
Aggregatea 0.62 0.04 3.23 0.0025  0.50 0.04 0.07 0.9467  2.46 0.0218 
N = 43. 
Notes. A' is a sensitivity measure adjusted for response bias. An A' of .5 reflects chance responding. An A' significantly greater than .5 
reflects the tendency to judge partner-similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces as possessing the trait. P-values indicate the probability that A' 
was significantly greater than .5. aAggregate—reflecting the transference effect—was computed by reverse scoring aggressiveness, 
and computing the mean A' for the six trait judgments. 
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Table 2.3. Tendency to judge partner-similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces as possessing a particular trait, reflected by mean A′ scores for 
each of the six trait judgments and their aggregate (i.e., facially-triggered transference), for women and men, statistically controlling 
for objective awareness of the resemblance. 
  
Women's A' compared to 
chance 
 
Men's A' compared to 
chance 
 
Women's A' 
compared to men's 
 Mean SE t p  Mean SE t p  t p 
Trustworthyb 0.65 0.04 3.96 0.0007  0.50 0.04 0.10 0.9243  1.95 0.0586 
Supportive 0.63 0.04 3.00 0.0047  0.53 0.04 0.67 0.5073  0.79 0.4372 
Intelligentb 0.63 0.04 3.50 0.0021  0.48 0.04 -0.49 0.6292  2.28 0.0287 
Attractive 0.62 0.04 2.88 0.0063  0.59 0.04 1.99 0.0530  1.34 0.1872 
Acceptingb 0.57 0.05 1.36 0.2001  0.52 0.05 0.45 0.6606  2.04 0.0481 
Aggressive 0.45 0.04 -1.26 0.2127  0.49 0.04 -0.32 0.7482  -0.93 0.3568 
Aggregatea,b 0.61 0.03 3.67 0.0014   0.52 0.04 0.46 0.6482   1.96 0.0572 
N = 46. 
Notes. A' is a sensitivity measure adjusted for response bias. An A' of .5 reflects chance responding. An A' significantly greater than .5 
reflects the tendency to judge partner-similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces as possessing the trait. P-values indicate the probability that A' 
was significantly greater than .5. aAggregate—reflecting the transference effect—was computed by reverse scoring aggressiveness, 
and computing the mean A' for the six trait judgments. bFor traits marked, the interaction between sex and A'awareness was statistically 
29
 
 
 
 
significant. So for these traits, separate linear mixed models were run for women and men to obtain estimated means and standard 
errors reported in the table. These means were then compared to chance by conducting one-sample t-tests. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE ROLE OF SHARED AND IDIOSYNCRATIC FACIAL CUES IN PERSON 
PERCEPTION: CATEGORICAL VERSUS EVALUATIVE JUDGMENTS 
A fundamental problem we are continuously faced with in everyday person perception is 
whether an unknown individual is a friend or a foe, trustworthy or untrustworthy, likeable or 
unlikeable. To resolve this problem, we simultaneously process a multitude of social cues 
including—but not limited to—a person’s social category membership (e.g., gender, ethnicity) as 
well as more subtle facial characteristics (e.g., babyfacedness, facial width-to-height ratio, 
resemblance to known others). Past work has revealed considerable agreement across observers 
in judgments of facial appearance and has identified shared facial cues—such as facial width-to-
height ratio, babyfacedness, and emotionally expressive features—that inform these judgments 
(e.g., Dotsch & Todorov, 2012; Carre, McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009; Oosterhof & Todorov, 
2008; Said, Sebe, & Todorov, 2009; Willis & Todorov, 2006; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). 
However, shared cues provide only half of the story. The other half is the idiosyncratic cues, or 
cues that are only relevant “in the eye of the beholder,”—such as facial resemblance to known 
others—which lead judgments to vary across perceivers (e.g., Günaydin, Zayas, Selcuk, & 
Hazan, 2012; Gawronski & Quinn, 2013; Kraus & Chen, 2010; Verosky & Todorov, 2010; 
2013). 
Although shared and idiosyncratic cues are simultaneously encountered when perceivers 
make sense of others in everyday life, they have so far been studied separately. Given shared and 
idiosyncratic cues are equally powerful predictors of judgments of unknown individuals 
(Hönekopp, 2006), it is essential to investigate how these cues influence, jointly or 
independently, person perception when both cues are presented to participants simultaneously. A 
major aim of the present studies was to fill this important gap in the literature. Specifically, we 
investigated how resemblance to a known other (a widely studied idiosyncratic cue; e.g., 
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Verosky & Todorov, 2010) and facial width-to-height ratio (a central shared cue; e.g., Carre et 
al., 2009) simultaneously affect judgments of unknown others. 
A related question that has not received attention in prior work is under what conditions 
idiosyncratic and shared cues would have additive vs. interactive effects on judgments. Past 
research studying the effect of multiple cues has produced mixed findings—with studies 
examining evaluative judgments (e.g., evaluating whether a person is trustworthy; Verosky & 
Todorov, 2013) reporting additive effects and studies examining categorical judgments (e.g., 
indicating the gaze direction of a target person; Adams & Kleck, 2003) reporting interactive 
effects. Although these findings imply that type of judgment may be one factor influencing the 
effect of multiple cues, this issue has not been systematically investigated. Therefore, another 
aim of the present research was to examine whether idiosyncratic and shared facial cues lead to 
additive vs. interactive effects depending on the type of judgment made—evaluative (i.e, 
indicating impressions of unknown faces) vs. categorical judgments (i.e., indicating whether 
unknown faces resemble a known other).   
Idiosyncratic Cues in Evaluation: Affective Generalization from Known Faces  
Work focusing on idiosyncratic cues—cues in the eye of the beholder—has investigated 
how judgments vary across perceivers based on each perceiver’s unique experiences. This work 
has shown that perceivers learn to associate behaviors of known others with their physical 
characteristics (e.g., Verosky & Todorov, 2010) and when an unknown individual is encountered 
who bears facial resemblance, associations about the known other generalize to the unknown 
individual. In other words, perceivers evaluate unknown persons that resemble known others (vs. 
those who do not) in ways consistent with the affective valence of the known other. Reading 
descriptive sentences suggesting that unknown others share personality attributes with (e.g., 
Andersen & Baum, 1994) as well as seeing that they bear facial resemblance to significant others 
(Kraus & Chen, 2010; White & Shapiro, 1987) can influence first impressions, even when 
perceivers are not consciously aware of the resemblance (Günaydin et al., 2012). This affective 
generalization can occur not only from significant others, such as one’s partner, but also from 
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celebrities (Tanner & Maeng, 2012) and newly encountered people described to engage in 
positive, negative, or neutral behaviors (Gawronski & Quinn, 2013; Verosky & Todorov, 2010; 
2013).  
Research focusing on affective generalization from newly encountered people typically 
asked participants in a learning phase to study neutral faces presented from a frontal viewpoint, 
paired with positive, negative, or neutral behaviors. Then, in the evaluation phase, participants 
were presented with morphs resembling these learned faces, again presented from a frontal 
viewpoint. This work suggests that compared with a neutral baseline, novel faces resembling a 
“bad person” are evaluated more negatively whereas resemblance to a “good person” does not 
appreciably influence judgments (Verosky & Todorov, 2010; 2013; but see Gawronski & Quinn, 
2013). One question that is left unanswered by this work is whether affective generalization can 
occur when stimulus conditions (e.g., orientation of faces, lighting conditions, facial expressions) 
during learning are different than those during evaluation. A key factor affecting the answer to 
this question is whether the representations of experimentally learned faces are abstract or view-
independent—that is, whether representations of these faces can reliably be activated if they are 
subsequently encountered under novel stimulus conditions. On the one hand, research on 
spontaneous trait inferences suggests that representations of learned faces are abstract (Todorov 
& Uleman, 2004). In this work, participants were first asked to learn faces, each paired with a 
behavior (e.g., “Mary told the cashier that she got too much change.”) implying a particular trait 
(e.g., honest). Participants were later shown face-trait pairs and were asked to identify which of 
the traits were presented in the learning phase. Perceivers were more likely to falsely recognize 
having seen a trait paired with a target person when the person was previously described to 
perform a behavior indicative (vs. not indicative) of that trait. Importantly, this false recognition 
effect was observed even when the orientation of faces at learning was different than their 
orientation at the recognition phase, although the effect got marginally weaker. The researchers 
took this as evidence that perceivers form abstract or view-independent representations of faces 
while spontaneously inferring traits from behavior. 
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On the other hand, there is work suggesting that representations of experimentally 
learned faces are far from being abstract (e.g., Patterson & Baddeley, 1977; Tong & Nakayama, 
1999). For example, Patterson and Baddeley (1977) asked participants to learn unknown faces 
and then, in a recognition test, to indicate whether they saw the faces previously. Recognition 
performance was almost perfect when the faces had identical poses at the learning phase and the 
test phase. However, when the viewpoint or the emotional expression of the learned faces was 
altered, recognition performance significantly dropped (although it was still above chance). 
Given that changes in stimulus conditions have a profound influence on recognition of newly 
encountered individuals, it is possible that affective generalization effects might not be readily 
observed when stimulus conditions in learning and evaluation phases are different—for example 
when newly encountered individuals are studied from a profile view but faces resembling these 
individuals are evaluated from a frontal view. However, in past work, stimulus conditions in 
learning vs. evaluation were not systematically varied to examine this question.  
Shared Cues in Evaluation: The Role of Facial Width-to-Height Ratio 
Idiosyncratic cues are not the only pieces of information that perceivers use to decide 
who is good vs. bad. There are also shared cues—such as facial width-to-height ratio, babyish 
features, and emotionally expressive features—that lead different perceivers to arrive at similar 
evaluative judgments (e.g., Carre et al., 2009; Said et al., 2009; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). 
A separate, and arguably more well-established, line of research on first impressions has focused 
on these shared factors.  
A finding that has recently emerged from this work is that facial width-to-height ratio 
(WHR), which is the bizygomatic width of the face scaled for height, is positively related to male 
aggression (Carre & McCormick, 2008; Carre, et al., 2009), and is negatively related to 
judgments of male trustworthiness (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010). For example, Stirrat & Perrett found 
that individuals judged men with wider (vs. narrower) faces as less trustworthy. This lack of trust 
also had behavioral manifestations, with men with wider (vs. narrower) faces being entrusted 
with less money during an economic game. 
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It has been suggested that the effect of WHR on judgments of trustworthiness develops 
by observing a covariation between WHR and certain traits in men over time (Stirrat & Perrett, 
2010). This account is supported by research showing that learned associations between a facial 
feature and a trait can influence judgments of novel faces that vary on that facial feature (Hill, 
Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Schuller, 1990). Specifically, participants exposed to long faced 
professors who were described as fair tended to later evaluate other long (vs. short) faced 
professors as more fair. The opposite was true for participants who were led to believe short 
faced professors were fair. This research suggests that perceivers can easily learn covariations 
between facial features and certain traits. Given prior work documenting a covariation between 
WHR and a number of behaviors signaling untrustworthiness—such as betraying the trust of 
others, deceiving others during negotiation, and cheating to enhance financial gain (Haselhuhn & 
Wong, 2012; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010)—it is possible that with continuous exposure to such 
behaviors performed by men with wider faces, perceivers are learning that WHR is a reliable cue 
of male trustworthiness.  
Despite the strong evidence documenting an association between high WHR and low 
trustworthiness judgments, whether prior experience with wide-faced individuals moderates this 
association is yet to be investigated. For instance, do repeated favorable interactions with a wide-
faced significant other attenuate the negative association between WHR and judgments of liking? 
No study so far has investigated this possibility. 
Multiple Cues in Categorization and Evaluation: Interactive versus Additive Effects 
Although research on shared and idiosyncratic cues each speaks to the factors that 
influence snap judgments, they have remained disconnected from one another. Yet, in daily life, 
both shared and idiosyncratic cues are simultaneously available when making sense of unknown 
others. Hence, getting a complete picture of person perception requires investigating how these 
cues simultaneously influence judgments of unknown others.  
Past research studying the effect of multiple cues on person perception has produced 
mixed findings—with studies examining evaluative judgments (e.g., judging whether a person is 
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trustworthy; Verosky & Todorov, 2013) reporting additive effects and studies examining 
categorical judgments (e.g., indicating the gaze direction of a target person; Adams & Kleck, 
2003) reporting interactive effects. Although these findings imply that type of judgment may be 
one factor influencing the effect of multiple cues, this issue has not been systematically 
examined. We propose that perceivers are likely to use multiple cues available to them in an 
additive fashion when they make evaluative judgments (e.g., good vs. bad). In contrast, when 
perceivers make categorical judgments (e.g., man vs. woman) based on a focal cue, the presence 
or absence of cues conveying conflicting information might influence how efficiently this cue is 
processed, producing interactive effects. 
 Indeed, past work asking perceivers to make social category judgments (e.g., happy vs. 
angry, male vs. female, white vs. black) showed that cues that are perceptually similar (e.g., a 
female face and a happy expression; Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 2007) or 
that signal similar intentions (e.g., a direct gaze and a happy expression; Adams & Kleck, 2003) 
interact to influence processing efficiency. For instance, there are perceptual similarities between 
a female face and a happy expression, and between a male face and an angry expression (Becker 
et al., 2007). When perceptually similar cues are simultaneously encountered, perceivers process 
these cues more efficiently, as indicated by faster and more accurate classification of angry 
expressions in male (vs. female) faces and happy expressions in female (vs. male) faces. 
Similarly, categorization of male (vs. female) faces was facilitated in the context of angry 
expressions whereas categorization of female (vs. male) faces was facilitated in the context of 
happy expressions.  
In addition to having perceptual similarities, different facial cues might communicate 
similar intentions, which also lead to interactive effects in categorical judgments. For example, a 
direct gaze and emotions of anger and joy communicate an approach motivation whereas an 
averted gaze and emotions of sadness and fear communicate an avoidance motivation. Because 
of this similarity in underlying intentions, when perceivers were presented with faces with direct 
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(vs. averted) gaze, anger and joy expressions were categorized faster whereas fearful and sad 
expressions were categorized slower (Adams & Kleck, 2003; 2005). 
Although interaction effects are often found when making categorical judgments, the 
picture is different when individuals are asked to make evaluative judgments (e.g., Verosky & 
Todorov, 2013). Now, the effects of multiple cues were found to be mostly additive. For 
instance, when evaluating ingroup vs. outgroup members, multiple cues indicating group 
membership led to predominantly additive effects, with the double ingroup evaluated most 
favorably, the double outgroup least favorably, and the mixed groups falling in between (for 
reviews see Crisp & Hewstone, 2007; Urban & Miller, 1998). Past work focusing on judgments 
of trustworthiness also revealed additive effects when facial cues indicating trustworthiness were 
simultaneously presented with behavioral information indicating trustworthiness (Rezlescu, 
Duchaine, Olivola, & Chater, 2012; Verosky & Todorov, 2013). Specifically, Rezlescu and 
colleagues (2012) asked participants to play an online economic game with unknown others. The 
only information available to participants was computerized faces of their opponents 
manipulated to look either trustworthy or untrustworthy as well as information about their 
opponents’ reputation—whether they displayed trustworthy or untrustworthy behaviors in 
previous rounds of the game. Trustworthy- (vs. untrustworthy-) looking individuals as well as 
those with a good (vs. bad) reputation were entrusted more money during the economic game, 
with the result being that those with both trustworthy appearances and good reputations 
benefiting the most. Similarly, Verosky and Todorov (2013) provided evidence that multiple 
cues have additive effects on evaluative judgments. Specifically, participants first studied a 
person’s face and read his biography indicating good, bad or neutral moral character. Then, they 
were presented with unknown individuals who bore resemblance to these moral agents and who 
were described to engage in positive, negative, and neutral behaviors.  Their results showed that 
resemblance to the moral agents and valence of behaviors had additive effects on judgments of 
trustworthiness.  
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Based on prior work on categorical and evaluative judgments, we predicted that 
simultaneous presentation of an idiosyncratic cue—resemblance to a known other in this case—
and a shared cue—facial WHR in this case—will have an interactive effect on categorical 
judgments and an additive effect on evaluative judgments. Given that resemblance to a known 
other and WHR both communicate trustworthiness, we expected that these two cues will interact 
to predict processing efficiency when participant are asked to categorize faces as resembling vs. 
not resembling a known other.  In contrast, we predicted to observe additive effects of 
resemblance and WHR when participants are asked to judge whether the faces are likeable or 
not. 
Overview of the Present Studies 
The primary aim of the present research is to investigate how shared (facial WHR in this 
case) and idiosyncratic cues (facial resemblance to known others in this case) jointly or 
independently influence person perception. Toward this aim, we conducted three studies. In all 
studies participants were asked to make judgments of novel faces varying in WHR and 
manipulated to resemble a known other using morphing techniques. Unlike past work in which 
participants could view the faces for an indefinite amount of time before providing their 
judgments (e.g., Stirratt & Perret, 2010), the faces were presented for only 500 ms (e.g., Willis & 
Todorov, 2005) to investigate whether WHR would still influence judgments when processed 
simultaneously with facial resemblance to known others for a very short duration. Based on past 
work, we expected that shared and idiosyncratic cues will have interactive effects on categorical 
judgments whereas these cues will have unique, additive effects on evaluative judgments.  
Study 1 focused on evaluative judgments and investigated how facial resemblance to a 
newly encountered individual (associated with positive, negative, or neutral behaviors) and 
WHR simultaneously influence snap judgments of liking. In addition, this study addressed an 
issue that was left unanswered in prior research by manipulating the orientation of the faces 
(frontal vs. profile) in the learning phase. This allowed us to test whether the match in stimulus 
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conditions (e.g., orientation of faces) in the learning and evaluation phases moderate the strength 
of the affective generalization effect.  
Studies 2 and 3 focused on both evaluative and categorical judgments.  In Study 2, 
participants were asked to complete a closeness generating interaction with a confederate to 
promote liking of a newly met acquaintance. Then, they completed a snap judgments task where 
they evaluated the likeability of novel faces resembling their new acquaintance (vs. not) and a 
separate categorization task where they categorized the novel faces in terms of whether the face 
resembles their new acquaintance or not.  
In Study 3, we took advantage of positive associations that occur naturalistically in daily 
life by focusing on resemblance of novel faces to one’s romantic partner. Similar to Study 2, 
evaluative judgments about partner-similar (vs. dissimilar) faces were assessed using a snap 
judgment task whereas categorical judgments regarding whether novel faces resembled the 
partner was assessed in a separate categorization task. Investigating the simultaneous effect of 
shared and idiosyncratic cues by recruiting romantic couples in Study 3 also allowed us to 
address another important question that is left unanswered by past work: Are the effects of 
shared cues altered by past experiences with close others? For example, if a perceiver’s romantic 
partner has a higher WHR, does this person still respond negatively to unknown men with higher 
WHRs? Repeated favorable experiences with a wide-faced partner as well as the general 
tendency to associate partners with positivity (e.g., Zayas & Shoda, 2005) may over time reduce 
the strength of the association between high WHR and untrustworthiness. Thus, Study 3 
investigated whether WHR is a less strong cue of trustworthiness for individuals who have a 
wide-faced partner.  
Study 1 
The primary aim of Study 1 was to investigate the extent to which perceivers’ evaluative 
judgments are influenced by the simultaneous presence of shared and idiosyncratic cues. 
Accordingly, multilevel modeling was used to investigate, for each perceiver, the effects of 
WHR (i.e., a shared cue) and resemblance to newly encountered individuals (i.e., an 
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idiosyncratic cue) on evaluative judgments about novel target individuals. Using procedures 
validated by past work (Verosky & Todorov, 2010), associations about the novel individuals 
were experimentally created by repeatedly pairing 6 different individuals with positive, neutral, 
or negative behaviors in a learning phase. Then, in the evaluation phase, participants completed a 
snap judgment task (Günaydin et al., 2012) in which they evaluated 24 faces resembling these 
learned faces and varying on facial WHR. Male faces were used in the study, given that prior 
work documented the effects of WHR mainly for male faces (e.g., Stirrat & Perrett, 2010). Using 
multiple facial stimuli in a within-participants design allowed us to examine the extent to which 
first impressions of novel targets are affected by both WHR and similarity to a known other. We 
expected that facial WHR of novel faces would be negatively related to snap judgments of liking. 
Moreover, based on past work (Verosky & Todorov, 2010; 2013), we expected that compared 
with a neutral baseline, novel faces resembling a “bad person” would be evaluated more 
negatively whereas resemblance to a “good person” would not appreciably influence judgments. 
We also investigated whether similarity in stimulus conditions between learning and 
evaluation phases would moderate the effect of the idiosyncratic cue. Unlike past work in which 
faces were presented from a frontal view during both learning and evaluation phases, the faces of 
the newly encountered people were presented from a frontal (0°) or a profile (45° or 135°) view 
in the learning phase to create either a match or a mismatch with the frontal orientation of novel 
faces in the evaluation phase. Based on past work suggesting that representations of 
experimentally learned faces are view-dependent—that is, they are activated less strongly under 
novel stimulus conditions (e.g., Patterson & Baddeley, 1977), we expected affective 
generalization to occur only when the stimulus conditions at learning match the stimulus 
conditions in which facial resemblance is processed. In other words, we expected to observe 
affective generalization only when both the learned face and the novel face are presented from a 
frontal viewpoint. However, if the learned face is studied from a profile view, but novel faces 
resembling the learned face are evaluated from a frontal view, the stimulus conditions at learning 
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do not match the stimulus conditions at evaluation. When there is such a mismatch in stimulus 
conditions, we expected the affective generalization effect to get weaker.  
Method 
Participants. Forty-four undergraduate students participated in the study. Four 
participants who failed to learn the associations between faces and behaviors in five or fewer 
rounds (see the Procedure and measures section for details) were excluded from the analyses, 
leaving 40 participants (Mean age=19.33 years, SD=1.25; 15 females). 
Procedure and measures. In the learning phase, participants were asked to study face-
behavior pairs using a paradigm developed by Verosky and Todorov (2010). Frontal (0°) and 
profile (45° and 135°) versions of six neutral faces with similar likability ratings were selected 
from the Radboud Face Database (Langner, Dotsch, Bijlstra, Wigboldus, Hawk, & van 
Knippenberg, 2010). In a within-participants design, three faces were presented from a frontal 
viewpoint and three faces from a profile (either 45° or 135°) viewpoint, each paired with five 
positive, neutral, or negative behaviors (taken from Fuhrman, Bodenhausen, & Lichtenstein, 
1989). Orientation and valence of each face were counterbalanced across participants. Upon 
presentation of the face-behavior pair, participants were asked imagine the person engaging in 
the behavior as vividly as possible before moving on to the next trial. Participants had to view 
each face-behavior pair for at least 5 seconds before they were allowed to continue.  
Next, we tested learning by asking participants to indicate whether each face was 
previously paired with positive, neutral, or negative behaviors. If participants gave an incorrect 
response, they were asked to repeat the learning trials, with each face paired with different 
behaviors of the same valence. Participants continued this procedure until they gave all correct 
responses or completed the learning trials eight times.  
In the evaluation phase, participants completed a snap judgment task. They evaluated 
each of 24 faces on 5 traits aimed to assess favorable impressions (trustworthy, supportive, 
warm, honest, selfish). Each trial consisted of a fixation cross (1000 ms), a face (500 ms), and a 
question (e.g., Trustworthy?), which remained on the screen until participants indicated “yes” or 
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“no” by pressing “D” or “K.” Trials were randomly presented except that the same trait question 
did not appear on consecutive trials. Responses to all five trait questions were averaged (after 
reverse scoring the trait selfish) to index snap judgments of liking for each novel face. 
Figure 3.1. Example of the morphing procedure used to digitally combine the known person’s 
photograph (an experimentally learned face in Study 1, a newly met acquaintance in Study 2, and 
a romantic partner in Study 3) with the photograph of a male target to produce a novel face 
resembling the known person. 
To create stimuli for the snap judgment task, we used frontal versions of the learned 
faces. We compiled 6 sets of 4 male faces (total of 24 faces) from standard face databases 
(Tottenham et al., 2009; Minear & Park, 2004). Each learned face was morphed with faces in one 
of the 6 sets. (see Figure 3.1 for an example). Face sets used for morphing with each learned face 
were counterbalanced across participants. All morphs were converted to grayscale and equated 
for luminance using the SHINE toolbox (Willenbockel, Sadr, Fiset, Horne, Gosselin, & Tanaka, 
2010) for MATLAB. To calculate facial WHR of each stimulus face in the snap judgment task, 
two raters independently measured the ratio of the bizygomatic width (i.e., the distance between 
the left and the right zygion) to the height (i.e., the distance between the upper lip and the upper 
eyelid) of each face following Stirrat and Perrett (2010). Since inter-rater agreement was very 
high (Cronbach’s α = .99, r = .98), WHRs were averaged across raters to create a single index of 
WHR for each face. 
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Data analytic strategy. We used multilevel modeling (MLM; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) to 
estimate the effects of facial similarity and WHR at the level of facial stimuli. The level-1 model 
estimated, for each participant, a regression line predicting snap judgment of each novel face 
from the face’s orientation (1 = frontal, 0 = profile), similarity to the negative learned face (1 = 
negative, 0 = positive, 0 = neutral), similarity to the positive learned face (0 = negative, 1 = 
positive, 0 = neutral), and WHR (standardized around the mean). We determined whether to 
estimate slopes as fixed or random using the procedures outlined by Hayes (2006)2
Level-1 model 
. The level-1 
equation was as follows: 
Equation 1.0 
 (snap judgment)ij = β0j + β1j(orientation) + β2j(similarity to negative) + β3j(similarity to 
positive) + β4j(WHR) +  rij 
where β0j represents participant j’s mean judgment of an average-WHR face presented from a 
profile viewpoint and resembling the neutral face, β1j, β2j, β3j, and β4j represent, for each 
participant j, the effects of orientation, similarity to negative learned faces, similarity to positive 
learned faces, and WHR, respectively, and rij represents the residual error term3
 The level-2 model estimated the average effects for the entire sample. The level-2 
equations were as follows: 
. 
Level-2 model 
                                                          
2 Across all studies, estimating a fixed slope for WHR provided a better fit. Estimating random 
slopes for variables pertaining to facial similarity provided better fit in all studies except Study 1. 
To maintain consistency, we estimated predictors pertaining to facial similarity as random across 
all studies. Nonetheless, estimating these predictors as fixed in Study 1 produced highly similar 
results. 
3 Given that each novel face is produced by morphing a learned face with an unknown face, an 
alternative method of modeling the data is to use the identity of learned faces and identity of 
unknown faces as random factors instead of using the identity of novel faces as a random factor. 
When the data were analyzed using this method, the variance component for identity of learned 
faces was not statistically different from zero (p = .18) and hence was dropped from the model. 
The model using identity of unknown faces as a random factor produced very similar results as 
reported in the text. 
a 
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Equation 1.1 
β0j = γ00 + u0j 
Equation 1.2 
β1j = γ10 + u1j 
Equation 1.3 
β2j = γ20 + u2j 
Equation 1.4 
β3j = γ30 + u3j 
Equation 1.5 
β4j = γ40  
where γ00 represents, for the entire sample, the mean judgment of an average-WHR face 
presented from a profile view and not resembling the neutral face, γ10, γ20, γ30, and γ40 represent 
the average effect of orientation, similarity to negative, similarity to positive, and WHR, 
respectively, and u0j, u1j, u2j, and u3j represent the residual error terms. 
Two-way and three-way interactions among orientation, similarity, and WHR were tested 
by adding the interaction terms to the model in separate MLMs. For example, the level-1 
equation testing whether there was a two-way interaction between similarity to a negative face 
and orientation was as follows:  
 (snap judgment)ij = β0j + β1j(orientation) + β2j(similarity to negative) + β3j(similarity to 
positive) + β4j(WHR) + β5j(similarity to negative × orientation) + rij 
The average effect of the interaction term in the sample was estimated by adding the 
following equation to level-2: 
β5j = γ50 + u5j 
All other interaction effects were tested using a similar approach. 
Estimation of Standardized Coefficients 
To give the reader a sense of the effect sizes, standardized coefficients were computed 
using the following formula (Snijders & Bosker, 1999).   
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standardized coefficient = [S.D.(X) / S.D.(Y)] * γ 
where S.D.(X) and S.D.(Y) refer to the standard deviations of the predictor and the dependent 
variable, respectively, and γ is the effect of the predictor estimated by the MLM. Standardized 
coefficients can be interpreted similar to the beta coefficients estimated in linear regression—as 
the increase in the dependent variable (in standard deviations) produced by each additional 
standard deviation increase in the predictor.  
Results and Discussion 
The effect of facial WHR and resemblance to learned faces. Participants evaluated 
novel faces less favorably as WHR increased (γ40 = -.037, SE = .010, p < .001, standardized 
coefficient = -.110), showing that facial WHR can influence judgments even when novel faces 
are presented for a very short duration (i.e., 500 ms). Moreover, novel faces were evaluated less 
favorably when they resembled individuals associated with negative (vs. neutral) behaviors (γ20 = 
-.068, SE = .028, p = .019, standardized coefficient = -.095). Facial similarity to individuals 
associated with positive (vs. neutral) behaviors did not appreciably affect judgments (γ30 = -.040, 
SE = .026, p = .130, standardized coefficient = -.056). Finally, there was no significant evidence 
that the effect of WHR varied across levels of similarity to negative or to positive faces (ps > 
.752).  These results extend past work by showing that shared and idiosyncratic cues have 
unique, additive effects on snap judgments of liking. 
The effect of stimulus conditions on affective generalization. Next, we looked at 
whether the effect of the idiosyncratic cue is moderated by the match in stimulus conditions—in 
this case the match in orientation of faces—between learning and evaluation. Results revealed 
that resemblance to negative faces led to less favorable evaluations when the faces were studied 
from a frontal view in the learning phase, matching the orientation of the faces in the snap 
judgment task (γ = -.118, SE = .043, p = .009, standardized coefficient = -.165), but not when the 
faces were previously studied from a profile view (γ = -.017, SE = .034, p = .627, standardized 
coefficient = -.024). The interaction between orientation and similarity to negative faces was 
marginally significant (γ50 = -.101, SE = .054, p = .067, standardized coefficient = -.112). Neither 
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the interaction between orientation and similarity to positive faces (γ50 = .017, SE = .053, p = 
.745, standardized coefficient = .019) nor the three-way interactions between similarity to 
positive or negative faces, orientation, and WHR reached significance (ps > .888). 
Overall, Study 1 provided the first evidence that when participants simultaneously 
encounter shared (e.g., facial WHR) and idiosyncratic cues (e.g., resemblance to a known other), 
these facial cues independently affect evaluative judgments of unknown others. Participants 
evaluated novel faces less favorably as WHR increased, even when the novel faces were 
presented as quickly as 500 ms. Moreover, novel faces resembling a negative (vs. neutral) known 
other was evaluated less favorably. However, this affective generalization effect occurred only 
when the orientation of the faces was matched in the learning and the evaluation phase (i.e., 
when faces were presented from a frontal viewpoint in both phases), suggesting that affective 
generalization from experimentally learned faces is view-dependent. 
Consistent with past work (Verosky & Todorov, 2010; 2013), resemblance to a “good 
person” did not appreciably influence evaluative judgments. That is, there was no evidence that 
participants evaluated faces resembling the positive known other more favorably than faces 
resembling a neutral other. It is possible that forming positive associations about a newly 
encountered person might require more than presenting participants with positive descriptive 
sentences about unknown individuals. Research showing that affective generalization can occur 
from significant others who are represented positively (Günaydin et al., 2012; Chapter 2) 
suggests that the effect of the idiosyncratic cue might depend on personal significance of known 
individuals. Perhaps a face-to-face interaction involving disclosure of personal information 
would provide a more vivid, personally relevant way of forming positive associations about a 
newly met person, which, in turn might lead to affective generalization. Indeed, such interactions 
have been reliably used by past work to create feelings of rapport between two unacquainted 
individuals (Aron, Melinat, Aron, Vallone, & Bator, 1997).  
 
 
 
 
50 
Study 2 
Study 2 used a closeness-generating interaction (Aron et al., 1997) to create positive 
associations about a newly met acquaintance in an ecologically valid way and assessed the 
unique and interactive effects of WHR (i.e., a shared cue) and resemblance to a known other 
(i.e., an idiosyncratic cue) on both evaluative and categorical judgments.  
Following Study 1, we predicted to observe additive effects of WHR and resemblance to 
a newly met acquaintance on evaluative judgments (i.e., snap judgments of liking). Given in 
Study 1 we did not find appreciable evidence for affective generalization from a “good person” 
associated with praiseworthy behaviors, Study 2 employed a closeness-inducing live interaction, 
which is a more personally relevant and vivid way of forming positive feelings toward a newly 
encountered person.  Live interactions also have the additional advantage of giving perceivers 
the opportunity to encode the newly encountered person’s face in motion, which past work has 
shown facilitates face recognition (e.g., Thornton & Kourtzi, 2002; but see O’Toole, Roark, & 
Abdi, 2002).  During a live interaction, a new person is encountered dynamically from multiple 
viewpoints, which, compared with static presentations of faces, gives perceivers greater 
opportunities to form an abstract, view-independent representation of the person (e.g., Pilz, 
Thornton, & Bülthoff, 2006). Hence, a live interaction that facilitates feelings of closeness and 
rapport among strangers appears to be a better test of whether positive associations about a 
newly encountered person can generalize to unknown others. 
Past work showed interactive effects of multiple cues when perceivers made categorical 
judgments (e.g., Adams & Kleck, 2003). Based on this work, we predicted shared and 
idiosyncratic cues would interact when participants are asked to categorize faces based on 
whether or not they resemble the newly met acquaintance. Given that resemblance to a positive 
known other and high WHR signal conflicting information—the former signals trustworthiness 
and the latter signals untrustworthiness—we expected that participants would be slower and less 
accurate when the target face resembled their new acquaintance but had a high WHR. 
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Method 
Participants. Thirty seven undergraduate students (Mean age=20.41 years, SD=1.67; 24 
females) participated in the study. 
Procedure and measures. The study was presented as consisting of two, ostensibly 
unrelated parts. In the first part, participants were told that the researchers were examining “first 
impressions in initial encounters.” Participants had a 45-minute closeness generating interaction 
with one of two male confederates whom they were told was another participant. During the 
interaction, the participant and the confederate took turns in reading aloud intimacy-building 
questions and then answering each question4
                                                          
4 The confederate was instructed to respond naturally to all questions but six. These six questions 
were scripted to give the impression that the confederate was clumsy, frugal, and superstitious. 
In the snap judgment task, participants evaluated novel faces on these three traits and three filler 
traits (blunt, conservative, headstrong) in addition to evaluative traits discussed in the text. 
Neither WHR nor resemblance to the interaction partner nor the interaction between these 
variables influenced evaluations of unknown faces on the scripted (ps > .65) or the filler traits (ps 
> .36), except a significant positive relationship between WHR of unknown others and responses 
to filler traits (γ20 = .062, SE = .019, p = .003), likely due to the fact that the filler traits were 
slightly negatively valenced. For the purposes of the current paper, we focused only on 
judgments on the evaluative traits. 
. Resembling the dynamics of relationship 
development in daily life, the questions were arranged such that the conversation evolved from 
topics that do not require much self-disclosure (e.g., Given the choice of anyone in the world, 
whom would you want as a dinner guest?) to those progressively requiring greater self-disclosure 
(e.g., “What is your most treasured memory?”). This procedure was shown to reliably generate 
feelings of closeness and intimacy toward a newly encountered person (Aron et al., 1997). After 
the interaction, participants completed four self-report items to assess how much they liked their 
new acquaintance (e.g., “In general, how positive is your impression of this person?”; 1 = Not at 
all to 7 = Very) and eight items to assess their willingness to engage in future interactions with 
their new acquaintance (e.g., “This seems like the kind of person whom I would like to get to 
know.”; 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). These two scales were significantly 
correlated (r = .63, p < .001). Thus, we computed their average to index favorable impressions 
 
 
52 
about the interaction partner (α = .91, M = 5.25, SD = .67). Impressions about the new 
acquaintance were above the midpoint of the scale (t(36) = 11.36, p < .001) regardless of which 
confederate participants interacted with (M=5.28, SD=.65 for Confederate 1 and M = 5.22, SD = 
.70 for Confederate 2, t(35) = .28).  
In the second part of the study, participants were asked to complete a snap judgment task 
about unknown others. The snap judgment task was similar to Study 1. Participants evaluated 24 
faces, either resembling Confederate 1 or Confederate 2 on 4 traits aimed to assess favorable 
impressions (trustworthy, supportive, warm, selfish)5
After completing the snap judgment task, participants’ impressions of their new 
acquaintance were assessed on the same four traits (trustworthy, supportive, warm, selfish) using 
a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very) to obtain another measure of liking of the acquaintance 
(α = .76, M = 5.65, SD = .80). Again, evaluations of the new acquaintance were above the 
midpoint of the scale (t(36) = 12.50, p < .001), regardless of which confederate participants 
interacted with (M = 5.85, SD = .85 for Confederate 1 and M = 5.48, SD = .73 for Confederate 2, 
t(35) = 1.45, p = .16). 
. Each trial consisted of a fixation cross 
(1000 ms), a face (500 ms), and a question (e.g., Trustworthy?), which remained on the screen 
until participants indicated “yes” or “no” by pressing “D” or “K.” Response keys (“yes” on left 
vs. right) were counterbalanced across participants. Responses to all four trait questions were 
averaged (after reverse scoring the trait selfish) to index snap judgments of liking for each novel 
face.  
                                                          
5 Since pilot testing showed that Confederate 1 had less distinctive facial features than 
Confederate 2, we morphed 60% of Confederate 1’s face with 40% of each unknown face 
whereas we morphed 50% of Confederate 2’s face with 50% of each unknown face. To test 
whether the morphing procedure created similar levels of resemblance between novel faces and 
each confederate, we looked at responses in the categorical judgment task. Specifically, to index 
participants’ ability to discriminate faces resembling the interaction partner from those that did 
not, we computed an A′ score for each participant (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Participants 
showed similar levels of discrimination when the interaction partner was Confederate 1 (A′ = 
.72) vs. Confederate 2 (A′ = .68, t < 1), revealing that the morphing procedure was successful in 
creating equal levels of similarity between the novel faces and each confederate’s face. 
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Finally, to measure categorical judgments participants completed a discrimination task 
identical to the snap judgment task except that participants indicated whether each of 24 faces 
resembled their new acquaintance or not.  
To create stimuli for the judgment tasks, we used morphing procedures similar to Study 
1. We took photographs of confederates’ faces straightly facing the camera with a neutral 
expression. We used the 24 faces compiled from databases in Study 1 to create 2 sets of male 
faces. We morphed Confederate 1’s face with each of 12 faces in one set and Confederate 2’s 
face with each of 12 faces in the remaining set6
Data analytic strategy. We used data analytic strategies similar to Study 1 to estimate 
the effects of facial similarity to confederate (1 = similar to Confederate 1, 0 = similar to 
Confederate 2) and WHR at the level of facial stimuli. The level-1 equation was 
. Face sets were counterbalanced across 
participants. All morphs were converted to grayscale and equated for luminance using the 
SHINE toolbox (Willenbockel et al., 2010). Facial WHR of each stimulus face in the snap 
judgment task was calculated using the procedures in Study 1 (Cronbach’s α = .85, r = .78). 
Level-1 model 
Equation 2.0 
 (snap judgment)ij = β0j + β1j(similarity to confederate) + β2j(WHR) + rij 
where β0j represents participant j’s mean judgment of an average-WHR face resembling 
Confederate 2, β1j and β2j represent, for each participant j, the effects of similarity to the 
confederate and WHR, respectively, and rij represents the residual error term. 
                                                          
6 Confederate 1 had higher WHR (2.01) than Confederate 2 (1.71). Hence faces morphed with 
Confederate 1’s face were on average higher in facial WHR (M = 2.00) than the faces morphed 
with Confederate 2’s face (M = 1.88, t(36) = 24.36, p < .001). Results showed that perceivers on 
average evaluated faces morphed with the higher (vs. lower) WHR confederate less favorably (M 
= .37 and M = .62, respectively, t(36) = 7.59, p < .001). However, to capture natural variation in 
WHR of each of 24 faces in addition to the differences in WHR created using the morphing 
procedure, we used MLM in our analyses rather than averaging across faces morphed with each 
confederate. Such a strategy increases the confidence that the findings are due to differences in 
facial WHR rather than differences between the confederates other than their WHR.  
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 The level-2 model estimated the average effects for the entire sample.  
Level-2 model 
Equation 2.1 
β0j = γ00 + γ01(interaction partner) + u0j 
Equation 2.2 
β1j = γ10 + u1j 
Equation 2.3 
β2j = γ20  
where γ00 represents, for the entire sample, the mean judgment of an average-WHR face 
resembling Confederate 2 for participants who interacted with Confederate 2, γ10 and γ20 
represent the average effect of similarity to confederate and WHR, respectively, γ01 represents 
the effect of interaction partner’s identity (1 = Confederate 1, 0 = Confederate 2), and u0j and u1j 
represent the residual error terms.  
 To test whether similarity to the newly met acquaintance influenced judgment, the term 
γ11(interaction partnerij) was added to Equation 2.2.  
Equation 2.2.1  
β1j = γ10 + γ11(interaction partner) + u1j 
The coefficient γ11  represents the interaction term between interaction partner’s identity 
(Confederate 1 vs. 2) and facial similarity of novel faces to the confederate (Confederate 1 vs. 2) 
and hence provides an estimate of affective generalization from the new acquaintance. That is, if 
this coefficient is significantly different from zero, this would indicate that similarity to the 
newly met acquaintance has an effect on judgment over and above which confederate 
participants interacted with and whether the target face resembles a given confederate. 
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Another MLM was performed to test whether the effect of WHR varied across levels of 
similarity to the newly met acquaintance. The level-1 equation was identical to Equation 2.0 
except that it included the similarity to confederate × WHR interaction term:  
(snap judgment)ij = β0j + β1j(similarity to confederate) + β2j(WHR) + β3j(similarity to 
confederate × WHR) + rij 
The level-2 model was as follows:  
β0j = γ00 + γ01(interaction partner) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11(interaction partner) + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + γ21(interaction partner)  
β3j = γ30 + γ31(interaction partner) + u3j 
 In this model, the coefficient γ31 corresponds to the three-way interaction between WHR, 
similarity to confederate, and the interaction partner’s identity, and hence provides an estimate of 
whether the effect of shared cue (WHR) varied depending on the levels of the idiosyncratic cue 
(similarity to the newly met acquaintance).  
To assess performance in the categorization task, similar multilevel models were 
conducted with accuracy of responses and categorization latencies of correct responses as 
dependent variables. Trials with latencies outside the expected range (<150 ms or >4999 ms) 
were excluded (2.6% of all trials). Latencies less than 300 ms and greater than 3000 ms were 
recoded to 300 ms and 3000 ms, respectively. Analyses were conducted using log-transformed 
latencies. Analyses using untransformed latencies were highly similar to those reported here.  
Accuracy of categorization was analyzed with similar MLMs except that the models were 
logistic given the binary outcome variable (correct response or not). Estimates from population-
average analyses (also referred to as Generalized Estimating Equations; Zeger, Liang, & Albert, 
1988) are reported.  
Results and Discussion 
Evaluative judgments. Replicating Study 1, participants judged novel faces less 
favorably as WHR increased (γ20 = -.069, SE = .014, p < .001, standardized coefficient = -.205).  
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To investigate whether affective generalization can occur from a newly met acquaintance, 
we looked at the interaction between similarity to confederate and the interaction partner. The 
coefficient of this interaction (i.e., γ11  in Equation 2.2.1) provides an estimate of affective 
generalization from the newly met acquaintance. For example, if participants whose interaction 
partner was Confederate 1 evaluate novel faces similar to Confederate 1 (vs. Confederate 2) or 
participants whose interaction partner was Confederate 2 evaluate novel faces similar to 
Confederate 2 (vs. Confederate 1) more favorably, this would provide evidence for affective 
generalization from the new acquaintance. In line with Study 1, there was no appreciable 
evidence that facial resemblance to the new acquaintance affected snap judgments. The 
interaction between the identity of the interaction partner and similarity to the confederate was 
not significant (γ11 = -.029, SE = .064, p = .651, standardized coefficient = -.036), failing to 
support the prediction that favorable impressions about a new acquaintance with whom one has 
just had an intimate face-to-face interaction would generalize to novel faces resembling this 
person.  
Finally, there was no significant evidence that the effect of WHR varied depending on 
similarity to the newly met acquaintance (γ31 = -.044, SE = .055, p = .433, standardized 
coefficient = -.056)7
Categorical judgments. Next, we looked at whether similarity to the newly met 
acquaintance and WHR interact to predict accuracy in the categorization task. Given the 
interaction between similarity to confederate and interaction partner represents the effect of 
. There was an unexpected effect of similarity to confederate (γ10 = -.149, SE 
= .035, p < .001, standardized coefficient = -.222) such that participants evaluated novel faces 
resembling Confederate 2 (vs. Confederate 1) more favorably. The specific confederate 
participants interacted with did not appreciably influence judgments (γ01 = .029, SE = .046, p = 
.534, standardized coefficient = .043).  
                                                          
7 Supplementary analyses were run to test whether post-interaction impressions or explicit trait 
judgments toward the confederate moderated the effect of WHR or similarity to the newly met 
acquaintance. No significant interaction effects emerged (all ps > .37). 
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similarity to the newly met acquaintance, the three-way interaction between interaction partner, 
similarity to confederate, and WHR would provide evidence that similarity to the new 
acquaintance and WHR yield interactive effects. Although none of the main effects were 
significant (ps > .162), results showed a significant interaction between similarity to confederate 
and interaction partner (odds ratio = .291, γ11 = -1.233, SE = .392, p = .003). Importantly, this 
effect was qualified by the predicted three-way interaction between interaction partner, similarity 
to confederate, and WHR (odds ratio = .336, γ31 = -1.092, SE = .340, p = .003), showing that the 
shared cue of WHR interacted with the idiosyncratic cue of resemblance to the acquaintance.  
To probe this three-way interaction, we first collapsed the two-way interaction between 
similarity to confederate and interaction partner into a dummy variable that represents whether 
novel faces resemble the newly met acquaintance (1 = acquaintance-similar, 0 = acquaintance-
dissimilar). For example, if the interaction partner was Confederate 1, a novel face similar to 
Confederate 1 was coded as acquaintance-similar whereas a novel face similar to Confederate 2 
was coded as acquaintance-dissimilar. Then, we ran an MLM including the main effects of WHR 
and similarity to the new acquaintance as well as the interaction between the two.   
When the novel faces were wider, participants were less likely to correctly categorize 
acquaintance-similar (vs. acquaintance-dissimilar) faces (odds ratio = .373, γ = -0.985, SE = 
.242, p < .001; see Figure 3.2). However, similarity to the new acquaintance did not appreciably 
influence categorization accuracy for narrower faces (γ = -.319, SE = .260, p = .227). The 
interaction between WHR and similarity to the new acquaintance was marginally significant 
(odds ratio = .717, γ= -.333, SE = .172, p = .061).   
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Figure 3.2. Probability of correctly categorizing novel faces as a function of facial WHR and 
resemblance to the newly met acquaintance in Study 2. 
Analyses focusing on latencies of correctly categorized trials (65% of all trials) revealed 
no significant main effects (ps > .157). Although the predicted three-way interaction between 
interaction partner, similarity to confederate, and WHR did not reach conventional levels of 
significance (γ = .101, SE = .071, p = .164, standardized coefficient = .156) either, we probed 
this interaction using the procedures outlined above. When the novel faces were wider, 
participants were marginally slower to correctly categorize acquaintance-similar (vs. dissimilar) 
faces (γ = .115, SE = .063, p = .078, standardized coefficient = .209) whereas when the novel 
faces were narrower, they were marginally faster to categorize acquaintance-similar (vs. 
dissimilar) faces (γ = -.072, SE = .042, p = .095, standardized coefficient = -.131). The 
interaction between WHR and the dummy variable representing similarity to the new 
acquaintance was significant (γ = .062, SE = .030, p = .042, standardized coefficient = .159; see 
Figure 3.3).  
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Figure 3.3. Latencies of correct responses in the categorization task in Study 2 as a function of 
facial WHR and resemblance to the newly met acquaintance. 
To sum, replicating Study 1, men with wider (vs. narrower) faces were evaluated less 
favorably even when the faces were presented as quickly as 500 ms. However, again, we did not 
find significant evidence that positive associations about a newly met acquaintance led to 
affective generalization, even though the learning occurred through a highly personal and 
intensive face-to-face interaction. This finding is consistent with Study 1, which failed to show 
significant affective generalization from a “good person” associated with praiseworthy 
behaviors, although it is inconsistent with the findings in Chapter 2 (Günaydin et al., 2012). 
The absence of affective generalization in the current study is interesting given the 
closeness-generating interaction provides a personally-relevant, ecologically valid way of 
forming positive associations about another person through mutual self-disclosures as in 
everyday life. Moreover, the face-to-face nature of the interaction enabled participants to view 
the acquaintance in motion for a prolonged duration (45 minutes), giving them ample 
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opportunities to form an abstract representation of the acquaintance’s face from multiple 
viewpoints. Although resemblance to the new acquaintance did not appreciably influence 
evaluative judgments, performance in the categorization task provided evidence that participants 
formed a favorable representation of their new acquaintance. Specifically, participants responded 
slowly and less accurately when similarity to the acquaintance was simultaneously accompanied 
by a higher WHR, a cue indicative of untrustworthiness, suggesting that perceivers displayed 
implicit liking of the acquaintance in the categorization task. 
 Why did participants display evidence of liking the confederate in the categorization task 
but not in the snap judgment task? One possibility is that the idiosyncratic cue was less subtle in 
the former task compared with the latter. In the snap judgment task there was no reference to the 
idiosyncratic cue. Given the idiosyncratic cue pertains to a newly formed representation, it is less 
likely to be spontaneously activated to make sense of unknown others (e.g., Andersen & Chen, 
2002; Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1995) in the absence of explicit instructions to attend 
to the cue. Therefore, when a subtle cue pertaining to a fledgling representation is encountered 
with multitude of other cues that might inform evaluative judgments (e.g., gender, ethnicity, 
facial WHR, babyish features, emotionally expressive features), it might not appreciably affect 
evaluative judgments. However, in the categorization task, participants were instructed to 
categorize faces on the basis of facial similarity to the acquaintance which amplified the salience 
of the idiosyncratic cue. When the idiosyncratic cue was salient, the positive representation of 
the new acquaintance might have been more strongly activated, which might have in turn led 
shared cues (e.g., facial WHR) congruent and incongruent with this representation to influence 
processing efficiency. Although speculative, this suggests that increasing the salience of the 
idiosyncratic cue in the snap judgment task or the accessibility of the newly formed 
representation might facilitate affective generalization from a newly met acquaintance. 
Study 3 
An example of a chronically accessible, positive representation that is naturally formed in 
day-to-day life is the representation of a significant other. Given such representations have 
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pervasive effects on how we make sense of unknown others (Andersen & Chen, 2002; Andersen 
et al., 1995; Tong & Nakayama, 1999), affective generalization should more readily occur when 
the idiosyncratic cue is resemblance to a significant other. Therefore, in Study 3 we examined 
how resemblance to one’s romantic partner (an idiosyncratic cue) and facial WHR (a shared cue) 
simultaneously influence evaluative and categorical judgments. In line with Study 2, we 
expected these cues would have unique, additive effects on evaluative judgments (i.e., snap 
judgments of liking) whereas they would have interactive effects on categorical judgments (i.e., 
indicating whether or not unknown faces resemble one’s romantic partner).  
To test these predictions, we re-analyzed data from Günaydin et al. (2012) using MLM to 
estimate for each perceiver the role of facial WHR  and resemblance to a romantic partner on 
evaluative and categorical judgments. Since WHR is a cue that predominantly influences 
evaluations of male faces (e.g., Stirrat & Perrett, 2010), the analyses focused on female 
perceivers who evaluated male targets. Moreover, reanalyzing this data set provided us with a 
unique opportunity to investigate whether being in a romantic relationship with a higher (vs. 
lower) WHR partner would diminish the effect of WHR on judgments of liking. Repeated 
favorable experiences with a high-WHR partner as well as the general tendency to associate 
partners with positivity (e.g., Zayas & Shoda, 2005) may over time reduce the strength of the 
association between high WHR and untrustworthiness. Therefore we predicted that in the snap 
judgment task WHR would be less strong cue of trustworthiness for individuals with high- (vs. 
low-) WHR partners. 
Method 
Participants. Thirty heterosexual women (Mean age=21 years, SD=2.96; relationship 
length=12-132 months) and their romantic partner participated in the study. One couple 
withdrew from the study, leaving 29 female participants. 
Procedure and measures. In session 1, participants posed for a neutral headshot (hair 
pulled back, jewelry/glasses removed). To create stimuli, we created yoked pairs between female 
participants. Using morphing procedures similar to Study 2, we morphed the partner’s 
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photograph with each of 12 of 24 male faces used in Studies 1 and 2 to create 12 “partner-
similar” faces. Similarly, we morphed the yoked participant’s partner’s face with each of the 
remaining 12 faces to create 12 “yoked-similar” faces. Each yoked pair saw the same faces, 
hence controlling for any peculiarities in stimuli. The sets of faces used in morphing were 
counterbalanced across participants. 
In session 2, which took place 2 to 4 weeks after session 1, participants completed a snap 
judgment task similar to Study 2. Specifically, they made snap judgments of each novel face (12 
partner-similar, 12 yoked-similar) on six traits (trustworthy, supportive, accepting, attractive, 
intelligent, aggressive). A subset of participants (N = 18) also completed a categorization task 
similar to Study 2 in which they indicated whether each novel face resembled their romantic 
partner (see Günaydin et al., 2012 for complete methodological details). 
Facial WHR of each novel face was calculated as in Study 1 except that a subset (20%) 
of the faces was measured by the second rater. Since inter-rater agreement was very high 
(Cronbach’s α=.97, r = .93), the first rater’s measurements were used in the analyses. 
Data analytic strategy. The data analytic procedures to test the unique and interactive 
effects of WHR and similarity to romantic partner on evaluative and categorical judgments were 
similar to previous studies. The level-1 equation for assessing snap judgments of liking was 
 Level-1 model 
Equation 3.0 
  (snap judgment)ij = β0j + β1j(similarity) + β2j(WHR) + rij 
where β0j represents participant j’s mean judgment of an average-WHR face not resembling the 
partner, β1j and β2j represent, for each participant j, the effects of similarity to the romantic 
partner and WHR, respectively, and rij represents the residual error term. 
 The level-2 model estimated the average effects for the entire sample. 
Level-2 model 
Equation 3.1 
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β0j = γ00 + u0j 
Equation 3.2 
β1j = γ10 + u1j 
Equation 3.3 
β2j = γ20 
where γ00 represents, for the entire sample, the mean judgment of an average-WHR face not 
resembling the partner, γ10 and γ20 represent the average effect of similarity and WHR, 
respectively, and u0j and u1j represent the residual error terms. 
Next, similar MLMs were conducted to test whether the effect of WHR on snap 
judgments varied depending on similarity to the partner. The level-1 equations were the same as 
the previous model except that they also included the similarity × WHR interaction term as a 
predictor. The level-2 equations were also the same except that an additional equation was 
included to estimate whether for the entire sample the average effect of WHR varied across 
levels of similarity. 
To assess performance in the categorization task, similar MLMs were conducted with 
categorization latencies of correct responses and accuracy as dependent variables. The outliers 
were handled using procedures reported in Study 2 (1.2% of all trials were excluded). Logistic 
MLMs were performed for analyzing accuracy given that the outcome is binary (correct response 
or not). 
Finally, an MLM was conducted to test whether having a high-WHR partner decreases 
the negative association between WHR and snap judgments. For this analysis, the level-1 model 
estimated, for each participant, a regression line predicting participant’s snap judgment of each 
yoked-similar face from WHR. Partner-similar faces were excluded from this analysis because 
morphing procedures used to create partner-similar faces makes the WHR of those faces similar 
to that of the partner. Thus, including partner-similar faces in this analysis would have made it 
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impossible to interpret whether any observed effects are due to the partner’s WHR or the novel 
face’s similarity to the partner. Therefore, only yoked-similar faces were used to test whether the 
WHR of the partner moderated the effect of target-WHR on snap judgments.  
Level-1 model 
Equation 4.0 
 (snap judgment)ij = β0j + β1j(WHR) + rij 
where β0j represents participant j’s mean judgment of a target face, β1j represents the effect of 
WHR (standardized), and rij represents the residual error term. 
 The level-2 model included the WHR of participant’s romantic partner as a predictor.  
Level-2 model 
Equation 4.1 
β0j = γ00 + γ01(partner-WHR) + u0j 
Equation 4.2 
β1j = γ10 + γ11(partner-WHR) 
In this analysis, the estimate of interest was γ11 as it represents the effect of partner-WHR 
on the slope predicting snap judgments from target-WHR.  
Results and Discussion 
 Evaluative judgments. Replicating previous studies, higher WHR was negatively 
associated with positivity toward novel faces (γ20 = -.059, SE = .013, p < .001, standardized 
coefficient = -.201). Facial similarity to one’s romantic partner also influenced snap judgments, 
with partner-similar faces being judged more positively (γ10 = .173, SE = .047, p = .001, 
standardized coefficient = .294). There was no appreciable evidence that the effect of WHR 
varied across levels of similarity (γ30 = -.014, SE = .019, p = .472, standardized coefficient = -
.034). In other words, when novel men resembled a romantic partner, both facial resemblance 
and WHR independently influenced judgments of liking. 
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 Interestingly, the relationship between WHR and liking was significantly attenuated for 
women with wide-faced partners (γ = -.032, SE = .018, p = .093, standardized coefficient = -
.117) whereas women with narrow-faced partners showed a strong negative association between 
WHR and judgments of liking (γ = -.084, SE = .026, p = .003, standardized coefficient = -.306). 
The interaction between partner’s WHR and target face’s WHR was marginally significant (γ11 = 
.026, SE = .015, p = .085, standardized coefficient = .089; see Figure 3.4)8
Figure 3.4. The association between novel faces’ WHR and judgments of liking as a function of 
romantic partner’s WHR. 
. This provides 
evidence that favorable experiences with a significant other can weaken the relationship between 
facial WHR and evaluation, suggesting that this relationship might have developed by observing 
a covariation between WHR and untrustworthiness in men over time (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010). 
                                                          
8 Results were highly similar when the analysis was conducted in the complete dataset including 
both partner-similar and yoked-similar faces (γ11 = .028, SE = .017, p = .085). 
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Categorical judgments. Next, we looked at performance in the categorization task for 
evidence that facial WHR and similarity to partner would interact to influence processing 
efficiency when participants are asked to make categorical judgments. Indeed, when the novel 
faces were wider, participants were less likely to correctly categorize partner-similar (vs. yoked-
similar) faces (odds ratio = .224, γ = -1.498, SE = .369, p = .009; see Figure 3.5), suggesting that 
cues signaling untrustworthiness (wider faces) can interfere with processing of resemblance of 
novel faces to partner. However, similarity to the partner did not appreciably influence 
categorization accuracy for narrower faces (odds ratio = .584, γ = -.537, SE = .355, p = .148). 
The interaction between similarity to partner and WHR was significant (odds ratio = .619, γ30 = -
.480, SE = .224, p = .046), along with a significant effect of similarity to the romantic partner 
(odds ratio = .361, γ10 = -1.018, SE = .308, p = .006), but no significant effect of WHR (odds 
ratio = 1.116, γ20 = .110, SE = .144, p = .448). 
Figure 3.5. Probability of correctly categorizing novel faces as a function of facial WHR and 
resemblance to the romantic partner in Study 3. 
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Analyses focusing on latencies of correctly categorized trials (80% of all trials) revealed 
a similar pattern. Participants were much slower in correctly categorizing partner-similar (vs. 
yoked-similar) faces when the novel faces were wider (γ = .145, SE = .038, p = .001, 
standardized coefficient = .307; see Figure 3.6). However, similarity to the partner did not 
appreciably influence responses to narrower faces (γ = .004, SE = .043, p = .926, standardized 
coefficient = .008). The interaction between WHR and similarity to the partner was significant 
(γ30 = .070, SE = .021, p = .004, standardized coefficient = .210).The negative relationship 
between WHR and response latencies approached marginal significance (γ20 = -.017, SE = .010, 
p = .109, standardized coefficient = -.072) and the effect of similarity to the romantic partner was 
significant (γ10 = .065, SE = .035, p = .080, standardized coefficient = .138) such that participants 
responded faster to partner-similar (vs. yoked-similar) faces.  
Figure 3.6. Latencies of correct responses in the categorization task in Study 3 as a function of 
facial WHR and resemblance to the romantic partner. 
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General Discussion 
Multitude of facial cues is simultaneously present when perceivers try to make sense of 
others in everyday life. By assessing judgments of twenty-four novel faces in a within-
participants design and using multilevel modeling to estimate for each perceiver the effects of 
facial resemblance and WHR at the level of facial stimuli, the present research is the first to 
investigate the simultaneous role of idiosyncratic and shared cues on person perception. To shed 
light on when the simultaneous presence of these multiple facial cues leads to additive or 
interactive effects, we made a distinction between categorical (i.e., indicating whether or not 
unknown faces are similar to one’s romantic partner or an acquaintance) and evaluative 
judgments (i.e., indicating whether unknown others are good or bad).  
Study 1 focused on evaluative judgments and showed that resemblance to newly 
encountered individuals and facial WHR had unique, additive effects on snap judgments of 
liking. Specifically, men with wider (vs. narrower) faces were evaluated less favorably even 
when the faces were presented for only 500 ms. We also found evidence that compared to a 
neutral baseline, unknown faces resembling a “bad person” described to engage in blameworthy 
behaviors were evaluated less favorably. Importantly, affective generalization from a “bad 
person” occurred only when the orientation of faces at learning was the same as the orientation 
of faces at evaluation, providing the first evidence that the match in stimulus conditions between 
learning and evaluation is a key factor influencing affective generalization. Interestingly, 
resemblance to a “good person” described to engage in praiseworthy behaviors did not 
appreciably influence judgments of liking. These results are consistent with past work (Verosky 
& Todorov, 2010; 2013) showing that affective generalization from a “bad person” is more 
pronounced than affective generalization from a “good person.” However, research described in 
Chapter 2 (Günaydin et al., 2012) provided evidence that resemblance to a positively-valenced 
significant other (i.e., one’s romantic partner) can lead to affective generalization. How can these 
findings be reconciled? One possibility is that personal significance of the known other might 
influence whether affective generalization can occur. 
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A more personally significant, intensive, and ecologically valid way of creating positive 
associations about a newly encountered person might be a face-to-face interaction. Therefore, 
Study 2 asked participants to engage in a 45-minute closeness-generating interaction with a new 
acquaintance. This study assessed both evaluative (i.e., trustworthy or not?) and categorical 
judgments (i.e., similar to acquaintance or not?) to investigate whether facial WHR and 
resemblance to the newly met acquaintance have additive or interactive effects depends on the 
type of judgment made. Results of the snap judgment task assessing evaluative judgments 
replicated the negative association between facial WHR and snap judgments of liking observed 
in Study 1. However, resemblance to the newly met acquaintance did not appreciably influence 
judgments of liking, suggesting that even a 45-minute closeness-generating interaction does not 
appreciably facilitate affective generalization from newly encountered individuals.  
Results of the categorization task in Study 2 showed that facial resemblance to the 
acquaintance and WHR interacted to influence processing efficiency. Specifically, participants 
were less accurate and somewhat slower in categorizing acquaintance-similar (vs. dissimilar) 
faces when the unknown faces were wider. Given facial WHR is a cue signaling 
untrustworthiness, the fact that it interferes with the processing of acquaintance-similar faces 
suggests that participants formed a positive representation of the acquaintance. If participants 
indeed represent the new acquaintance positively, as implied by performance in the 
categorization task, why don’t they generalize this positivity to unknown others resembling this 
person in the snap judgment task? The subtlety of the idiosyncratic cue in each task might 
account for this discrepancy. Unlike the categorization task in which participants are instructed 
to categorize faces on the basis of resemblance to the new acquaintance, participants received no 
instructions to process the resemblance in the snap judgment task. Therefore, the idiosyncratic 
cue was likely far less salient when participants made evaluative judgments, which might have 
resulted in no appreciable effect of this cue on liking. 
Study 3 reanalyzed data presented in Chapter 2 to investigate how facial resemblance to 
romantic partners (an idiosyncratic cue) and WHR (a shared cue) simultaneously influence 
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categorical and evaluative judgments. Results showed an additive effect of these cues when 
participants were asked to make evaluative judgments in the snap judgment task. The negative 
relationship between facial WHR and liking found in previous studies was replicated. Moreover, 
women evaluated unknown men resembling their romantic partner (vs. a yoked participant’s 
partner) more favorably. Although we did not find a significant interaction between shared and 
idiosyncratic cues to predict evaluative judgments, these cues interacted to predict processing 
efficiency when participants made categorical judgments. Similar to the results of Study 2, 
participants were less accurate and slower in categorizing partner-similar (vs. yoked-similar) 
faces when the unknown faces were wider. These findings suggest that resemblance to a liked 
known other—an idiosyncratic cue signaling trustworthiness—might be processed less 
efficiently in the context of a greater WHR—a shared cue signaling untrustworthiness. 
Multiple Cues in Person Perception: Categorical versus Evaluative Judgments 
The present studies provide the first systematic examination of whether type of judgment 
made (categorical vs. evaluative) influence the effect of multiple facial cues. Our results 
indicated that shared and idiosyncratic cues signaling trustworthiness have unique, additive 
effects on evaluative judgments whereas these cues have interactive effects on categorical 
judgments.  
Why do the effects of shared and idiosyncratic cues depend on the type of judgment 
made? When perceivers are asked to make evaluative judgments (e.g., good vs. bad), perceivers 
are likely to use the infinite number of cues—the person’s gender, ethnicity, facial WHR, 
babyfacedness, similarity to known others, to name just a few—available to them to evaluate the 
person. Research by Halford, Baker, McCredden, and Bain (2005) suggests that perceivers 
cannot accurately process interactions between more than four variables. Given such limitations 
on cognitive capacity, when the task at hand involves processing of a large number of cues—as 
in the case of evaluative judgment tasks—perceivers might process cues in an additive fashion 
rather than taking into account the complex interactions between a large number of cues. In 
contrast, when participants are asked to make categorical judgments (e.g., partner-similar or 
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dissimilar), the very nature of the task increases the salience of a particular focal cue (e.g., 
similarity to partner)—making it the basis of perceivers’ judgments (e.g., Taylor & Fiske, 1978). 
Limiting attention to only one cue will likely reduce the relative complexity of the judgment task 
at hand and free cognitive resources to process whether cues are congruent or incongruent with 
the focal cue. Hence, when perceivers are asked to make categorical judgments, the presence or 
absence of cues conflicting with the focal cue might influence processing efficiency, producing 
interactive effects. 
Although speculative, it is also possible that when categorizing faces similar to a liked 
known other, activation of amygdala—a region implicated in assessments of others’ 
trustworthiness (e.g., Engell, Haxby, & Todorov, 2007; Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 
2002)—in response to wider (vs. narrower) faces is interfering with activation in fusiform face 
area—a region implicated in categorization of faces (e.g., Freeman, Rule, Adams, & Ambady, 
2010; Platek & Kemp, 2009) and is shown to be modulated by activity in amygdala (e.g., 
Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2004). Future work should investigate this 
possibility.  
The present work by showing that the effect of multiple facial cues might depend on the 
type of judgment might facilitate cross-fertilization of separate lines of work showing additive or 
interactive effects. Cues so far shown to have interactive effects (e.g., gaze direction and 
emotional expressions, Adams & Kleck, 2003) might produce additive effects when perceivers 
are asked to make evaluative judgments. Similarly, cues shown to predominantly have additive 
effects (e.g., multiple cues indicating ingroup status, Crisp & Hewstone, 2007) might lead to 
interactive effects when perceivers are asked to make categorical judgments.  
The Role of Idiosyncratic Experiences on Shared Cues 
The present research addressed an important question that was left unanswered by past 
work—whether the negative effect of WHR on snap judgments of liking depends on the 
idiosyncratic experiences of the perceiver. Study 3 showed that having a significant other with a 
greater WHR can alter how this cue influences evaluations of unknown others. Specifically, the 
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negative association between WHR and positive judgments was dampened for women with a 
high-WHR partner as compared to their counterparts with a low-WHR partner. This shows that 
idiosyncratic experiences can alter the extent to which cues that are shared across perceivers 
influence judgment. The susceptibility of WHR to effects of idiosyncratic experiences implies 
that the association between facial WHR and trustworthiness might be a product of personal 
experiences with wide- and narrow-faced men (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010).  
These findings also raise the possibility that representations of other cues assumed to be 
widely shared across perceivers—such as babyish or emotionally expressive features—(e.g., 
Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008) can be altered by idiosyncratic experiences. For example, past 
research showed that neutral faces bearing a slight resemblance to disgust and fear expressions 
are evaluated less favorably than those bearing a resemblance to happy expressions (e.g., Said et 
al., 2009). Would the negative relationship between facial resemblance to disgust expressions 
and liking be attenuated if a perceiver has a romantic partner who frequently expresses disgust? 
Similarly, would babyish features no longer be a strong cue of trustworthiness (e.g., Zebrowitz, 
Fellous, Mignault, & Andreoletti, 2003) if a perceiver has a mature-faced partner? Future work 
should explore these and similar questions.    
By investigating the simultaneous role of facial resemblance to known others and WHR 
on person perception, the present research is the first to bridge distinct lines of research focusing 
on shared and idiosyncratic facial cues. Moreover, focusing on both evaluative and categorical 
judgments, the present work reconciles seemingly disparate research reporting additive versus 
interactive effects of multiple cues and opens exciting avenues for future work. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHS PREDICT EVALUATIONS 
FOLLOWING LIVE INTERACTIONS 
Research asking individuals to provide their impression of others based on still 
photographs revealed that we glean a great deal of information from a target person’s facial 
appearance (e.g., Willis & Todorov, 2006). However, does facial appearance play a role in first 
impressions even when we interact with a person face-to-face? One way to answer this question 
is to compare judgments from static faces to those following live interactions. Since facial 
appearance is available to perceivers in both settings, consistency in judgments would provide 
evidence that perceivers tend to “judge a book by its cover.” Although considerable research has 
focused on impressions based on face-to-face interactions (e.g., Chapdelaine, Kenny, & 
LaFontana, 1994; Finkel & Eastwick, 2008; Letzring, Wells, & Funder, 2006), this work has 
remained relatively separate from research investigating judgments based on a person’s 
photograph (e.g., Günaydin, Zayas, Selcuk, & Hazan, 2012; Willis & Todorov, 2006). Present 
work aims to bridge this gap by investigating whether our impressions from photographs of faces 
relate to impressions following actual interactions. 
On the one hand, research shows that a face-to-face interaction provides more 
information about another person than a static face does. Cues afforded by a live interaction—
such as nonverbal behaviors including body posture, head nodding, gaze direction, and 
nonconscious mimickry (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1990), 
tone of voice (e.g., Berry, 1992), content of speech (e.g., Ireland, Slatcher, Eastwick, Scissors, 
Finkel, & Pennebaker, 2011), and choice of clothing (e.g., Mills & Aronson, 1965)—have been 
shown to influence judgments of liking. Thus, it is possible that these additional cues might 
drown out the effect of facial appearance on judgments during live interactions, which would 
result in little or no association between impressions from photographs and those following face-
to-face interactions.  
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On the other hand, there is evidence showing that physical appearance plays an important 
role in how individuals evaluate and treat others (e.g., Günaydin et al., 2012; Langlois, 
Kalakanis, Rubenstein, Larson, Hallam, & Smoot, 2000; Olivola & Todorov, 2010). For 
example, a meta-analysis conducted by Langlois and colleagues showed that attractive 
individuals are evaluated and treated more favorably across cultures than their unattractive 
counterparts. Moreover, research by Olivola and Todorov (2010) found that when perceivers 
catch a glimpse of a person’s physical appearance (vs. not), they rely less on diagnostic 
information (e.g., the base rate of drinking in the population) to predict the person’s 
characteristics (e.g., whether s/he drinks or not).   This suggests that physical appearance 
dramatically influences the extent to which perceivers incorporate additional information about a 
person in their first impressions. Given that judgments of liking can be made very quickly based 
on a very brief exposure to a person’s face (Willis & Todorov, 2006), it is possible that 
perceivers might interpret the additional information they are getting from a live interaction to fit 
rapid judgments based on facial appearance (e.g., Darley & Gross; 1983; Gilbert & Osborne, 
1989) or shape the interaction in ways that confirm their snap judgment based on facial 
appearance (e.g., Denrell, 2005; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977). This work suggests that the 
facial appearance of a person may color all the additional information provided by an actual 
interaction. So one might expect a strong association between judgments based on static images 
and those following an interaction. 
To date, no work has compared judgments of liking from photographs and those 
following live interactions. The handful of studies that compared judgments based on 
photographs to those based on short video clips focused exclusively on judgments of 
attractiveness. These studies produced mixed findings, with some studies reporting significant 
and sizeable positive correlations and some reporting weak and nonsignificant correlations 
between judgments of attractiveness based on static faces and those based on videos (Lander, 
2008; Penton-Voak & Chang, 2008; Rhodes, Lie, Thevaraja, Taylor, Iredell, Curran et al., 2011; 
Roberts, Saxton, Murray, Burriss, Rowland, & Little, 2009; Rubenstein, 2005). In addition to 
 
 
80 
focusing solely on attractiveness judgments, these studies mostly employed between-participants 
designs (but see Roberts et al., 2009), in which participants evaluating the photographs were 
different than those evaluating the videos. Such designs can only capture evaluative standards 
shared across perceivers but fail to tap into idiosyncratic factors (e.g., an unknown other’s facial 
resemblance to one’s romantic partner) that might lead perceivers to evaluate others similarly 
based on photographs and live interactions (e.g., Günaydin et al, 2012; Hönekopp, 2006). 
The present studies employed a within-participants design in which each perceiver 
evaluated the target person (i.e., a confederate) both based on a photograph and a subsequent live 
interaction to investigate whether judgments of liking from photographs predict those following 
live interactions (“static-live association”). In Study 1, we investigated this question using a 
structured interaction (i.e., trivia game), which past work showed gives participants very little 
opportunity to get to know another person (Letzring et al., 2006). In Study 2, we tested whether 
the static-live association will hold even when impressions from photographs were obtained at 
least one month prior to the actual interaction. Moreover, this study employed both structured 
and unstructured interactions to investigate whether the static-live association will be observed 
for an unstructured interaction in which interaction partners can obtain more information about 
one another. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. Forty-nine undergraduate students participated in the study. One 
participant was excluded from the analyses because he already knew the confederate, leaving 48 
participants (Mean age=20.44 years, SD=2.57; 37 females)9
                                                          
9 Participants were preselected such that 23 indicated that their interaction partner resembled a 
significant other and 25 indicated that she did not resemble a significant other. Resemblance to 
the significant other did not influence impressions from the photograph or those following the 
live interaction (ts<1), and did not moderate the relationship between these two variables (t = 
1.06, p = .30) so it will not be discussed further. 
. 
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Procedure and measures. Participants came to the lab to interact with one of 14 female 
confederates, who they were told was another participant. Participants were first shown a color 
photograph of the confederate (smiling in front of a neutral background, see Figure 4.1 for an 
example) and were asked to provide impressions of her based on the photograph. They 
completed eight items assessing liking of the confederate (e.g., “In general, how positive is your 
impression of this person?”; 1 = Not at all to 7 = Very, α = .82) and nine items assessing 
willingness to engage in future interactions with the confederate (e.g., “This seems like the kind 
of person whom I would like to get to know.”; 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree, α = 
.92)10. Since these two scales were significantly correlated (r = .55, p < .001), they were 
averaged to index favorable impressions about the confederate (α = .91, M = 5.07, SD = .67)11
Figure 4.1. Examples of confederate photographs used in Studies 1 and 2. Participants provided 
first impressions of the confederate based on a smiling photograph in Study 1 and both smiling 
and neutral photographs in Study 2.  
.  
Then, participants engaged in a 10-minute interaction with the confederate. Prior to the 
interaction, the experimenter checked the confederate’s physical appearance to make sure that 
                                                          
10 Participants also rated their interaction partner on forty adjectives that are not relevant to the 
purpose of the current study and will not be discussed further. 
11 The results using each subscale were highly similar to those reported here. 
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her makeup and hair were identical to those in her photograph. Confederates were instructed to 
respond naturally to the participant during the interaction. 
The interaction involved playing a trivia game, which consisted of ten questions of low, 
moderate, and high difficulty taken from Nelson and Narens (1980). The participant and the 
confederate were instructed to work together to come up with an answer to each question and 
even if they do not know the answer, to continue brainstorming about each question until their 
time is up.  At the end of the interaction, the confederate left the room and participants 
completed the same items as before to provide impressions of her based on the interaction (α = 
.96, M = 5.27, SD = .88). At the end of the session, participants completed some self-report and 
demographic measures, and were fully debriefed.  
Data Analytic Strategy 
Because data points for each participant were nested within confederates and impressions 
of the confederate were obtained at two time points (i.e., after viewing the photograph and 
following the live interaction), we used linear mixed models (LMMs) to account for 
interdependency among data points. An LMM was performed with liking following the trivia 
game interaction as the dependent variable and liking based on the photograph as a fixed 
predictor. We also tested for random effects using procedures recommended by Hayes (2006) but 
found no significant evidence that the intercept and the slope of the predictor varied across 
confederates (χ2(1) = 1.09, p = .30 and χ2(1) = 3.33 p = .07, respectively)12
Estimation of Standardized Coefficients 
.  
To give the reader a sense of the effect sizes, standardized coefficients were computed 
using the following formula (Snijders & Bosker, 1999).   
standardized coefficient = [S.D.(X) / S.D.(Y)] * B 
where S.D.(X) and S.D.(Y) refer to the standard deviations of the predictor and the dependent 
variable, respectively, and B is the effect of the predictor estimated by the LMM. Standardized 
                                                          
12 When the model allowed the slope of the predictor to vary across confederates, the results 
were highly similar to those reported here. 
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coefficients can be interpreted similar to the beta coefficients estimated in linear regression—as 
the increase in the dependent variable (in standard deviations) produced by each additional 
standard deviation increase in the predictor. 
Results and Discussion 
There was a strong positive relationship between liking from the photograph and liking 
following the live interaction (B = .745, SE = .159, t(46) = 4.693, p < 0.001, standardized 
coefficient = .569, see Figure 4.2). In other words, participants who had favorable impressions of 
their interaction partner from the photograph also tended to like her after the interaction. This 
suggests that facial appearance continues to inform impressions even after obtaining richer 
information about a person via an actual interaction. A major strength of Study 1 is employing a 
large number of target individuals (i.e., confederates), making it unlikely that the static-live 
association is due to characteristics of target individuals and hence increasing the generalizability 
of current findings.  
The trivia game interaction we used in Study 1 provided little opportunity to participants 
to get to know their interaction partner. This leaves open the question of whether the static-live 
association would hold following an unstructured interaction which encourages participants to 
get to know their interaction partner better. Hence, we investigated in Study 2 whether 
impressions from photographs predict impressions following both structured and unstructured 
interactions. In addition, initial impressions based on the photograph were obtained at least one 
month before the actual interaction to prevent participants from forming conscious expectations 
about the interaction. 
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Figure 4.2. The association between judgments based on the photograph and those following the 
trivia game interaction in Study 1.  
Study 2 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-six undergraduate students participated in the study. One participant 
was excluded from the analyses because she already knew the confederate, leaving 55 
participants (Mean age=20.15 years, SD=2.02; 37 females). 
Procedure and measures. Participants were asked to fill out an online prescreening 
survey in which they provided first impressions of each of four confederates based on a neutral 
and a smiling color photograph taken in front of a neutral background (see Figure 4.1 for 
examples). The order in which participants rated the confederates and the order in which smiling 
and neutral photographs were presented were counterbalanced across participants. Participants 
were asked to evaluate each photograph on four traits used in past work (Willis & Todorov, 
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2006; trustworthy, likeable, competent, aggressive; 1 = Not at all to 7 = Extremely) and four 
items assessing willingness to engage in future interactions with the person (e.g., “This seems 
like the kind of person whom I would like to get to know.”; 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly 
agree). These eight items were averaged to index favorable impressions about the confederate (α 
= .91, M = 4.42, SD = 1.13 for the neutral and α = .93, M = 4.80, SD = 1.15 for the smiling 
photograph). Participants also rated the photographs on attractiveness (1 = Not at all to 7 = 
Extremely). To get reliable measures of liking and attractiveness based on photographs, we 
averaged across ratings of neutral and smiling photographs of each confederate (α = .95, M = 
4.61, SD = 1.11 for liking and α = .91, M = 3.98, SD = 1.56 for attractiveness). 
Participants came to the lab at least one month (range = 35-212 days13
Participants were fully debriefed at the end of the session. As part of the debriefing 
protocol, we asked participants to indicate anything they found strange or unusual about the 
study, guess the study hypotheses, and report whether they were suspicious at any point in the 
experiment that their interaction partner might be a confederate. Four participants reported 
) after completing 
the prescreening survey and were asked to interact with one of the four confederates. We 
preselected participants from the responders in the online survey such that they either had a very 
favorable (M = 5.60, SD = .24) or an unfavorable (M = 3.50, SD = .44, t(53) = 22.14, p < .001) 
initial impression of their interaction partner based on the photograph. Participants first played a 
trivia game with the confederate for 10 minutes similar to Study 1 and at the end of the game 
reported impressions of the confederate (α = .89) using the same questions as in the photograph 
evaluation. Then, they completed another 10-minute interaction in which they were instructed to 
try to get to know the other person as much as they can (“getting to know interaction”). At the 
end of this interaction, participants again provided impressions of the confederate (α = .89). 
Similar to Study 1, the confederate responded naturally to the participant during the lab session 
and her physical appearance (i.e., makeup, hair) was identical to that in the photographs. 
                                                          
13 The time lag between rating the photograph and the lab session did not moderate the static-live 
relationship (t < 1). 
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having seen the photograph of the confederate in the online survey and two reported that the 
confederate looked familiar. 
Data Analytic Strategy 
An LMM was performed with liking following the live interaction as the dependent 
variable, type of interaction (trivia game vs. getting to know interaction) and liking based on the 
photograph as fixed predictors. Neither the intercept nor the slope of liking based on the 
photograph varied across confederates (χ2(1) = 1.10, p = .29 and χ2(1) = 1.15, p = .21, 
respectively). We investigated whether the static-live association can be accounted by factors 
such as attractiveness or general likeability of the confederate by adding each of these factors to 
the above model in separate LMMs. The standardized coefficients were computed as described 
in Study 1. 
Results and Discussion 
The LMM analysis showed that replicating Study 1, there was a strong positive 
relationship between liking from the photograph and liking following the interaction (B = .489, 
SE = .062, t(107) = 7.829, p < 0.001, standardized coefficient = .595, see Figure 4.3). 
Importantly, the static-live association held excluding the 6 participants who remembered seeing 
the confederate in the online survey or who reported that the confederate looked familiar (B = 
.498, SE = .066, t(95) = 7.546, p < 0.001, standardized coefficient = .602). These findings show 
that impressions from photographs predict impressions following live interactions even when 
perceivers have no recollection of seeing the other person’s photograph and hence cannot form 
conscious expectation about the live interaction. 
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Figure 4.3. The association between judgments based on photographs and those following the 
trivia game and getting to know interactions in Study 2. 
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Consistent with past work showing that self-disclosure promotes rapport (Aron, Melinat, 
Aron, Vallone, & Bator, 1997), participants reported greater liking following the getting to know 
interaction (M = 5.798, SE = .097) compared to the trivia game (M = 5.507, SE = .097, t(107) = 
2.110, p = 0.037, standardized coefficient = .161). However, the static-live association did not 
vary by the type of interaction (B = -.055, SE = .125, t(106) = -.439, p = 0.662, standardized 
coefficient = -.047), suggesting that facial appearance plays a role in first impressions even after 
getting to know the other person better.  
Is the static-live association driven by dispositional differences that participants might 
have in liking of others? It is possible that some participants have a general tendency to like or 
dislike others. If the static-live association is primarily driven by such dispositional differences, 
then it should become insignificant controlling for impressions about the other three 
confederates’ photographs. Although liking of the other confederates based on their photographs 
was significantly related to liking following the live interaction with a different interaction 
partner (B = .399, SE = .143, t(106) = 2.792, p = 0.006, standardized coefficient = .243), 
controlling for this variable the static-live association held (B = .383, SE = .071, t(106) = 5.364, p 
< 0.001, standardized coefficient = .466). This suggests that consistency in initial judgments and 
later evaluations cannot fully be accounted by dispositional differences in liking of others. 
Another question of interest is whether the static-live association is driven by how 
likeable the confederate is in general. To test this, we used evaluations provided by respondents 
in the online survey who rated all confederate photographs but did not participate in the lab 
session (N=602) and computed a consensual likeability score for each confederate by averaging 
across the responders’ liking scores. Liking of the confederate following the live interaction was 
positively associated with her consensual likeability based on the photograph, although 
marginally so (B = .826, SE = .444, t(106) = 1.861, p = 0.065, standardized coefficient = .142). 
Importantly, the static-live association held after controlling for the confederate’s consensual 
likeability (B = .469, SE = .063, t(106) = 7.472, p < 0.001, standardized coefficient = .571). This 
suggests that participants’ idiosyncratic biases in evaluations based on facial appearance play a 
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bigger role in judgments following live interactions than shared cues influencing the general 
likeability of the confederate. 
Finally, is the static-live association accounted by attractiveness of the confederates? 
Although past work comparing judgments of attractiveness based on photographs and those 
based on short video clips produced mixed findings, they nonetheless suggest that we might 
observe consistency in judgments because participants might be assessing the confederate’s 
likeability based on her attractiveness. Results showed a marginal positive relationship between 
perceived attractiveness of the confederate based on the photographs and judgments of liking 
following the live interaction (B = .108, SE = .056, t(106) = 1.924, p = 0.057, standardized 
coefficient = .184). However, controlling for perceived attractiveness of the confederate, liking 
based on the photograph significantly predicted liking following the live interaction (B = .397, 
SE = .078, t(106) = 5.064, p < 0.001, standardized coefficient = .483). This suggests that 
perceivers’ evaluations based on photographs go beyond attractiveness of the confederates, but 
rather reflect an assessment of the perceived likeability of the person. 
General Discussion 
By showing that impressions from photographs predict impressions following live 
interactions, present research provides compelling evidence that facial appearance plays an 
important role in judgments. Why is there are sizeable association between impressions from 
photographs and impressions following live interactions? One possibility is participants might 
form conscious expectations about their interaction partner upon seeing her photograph and then 
during the interaction selectively attend to cues that might confirm those expectations (e.g., 
Darley & Gross; 1983) or elicit behaviors from the interaction partner that are in line with their 
initial expectations (e.g., Snyder et al., 1977). Another possibility is that cues pertaining to facial 
appearance, which are available both when making judgments based on photographs and 
judgments based on live interactions, are driving this association. Study 2 supports the latter 
interpretation by showing that judgments based on photographs predicted those following actual 
interactions that took place at least a month later. Participants who did not remember having seen 
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the person previously and who could not have formed conscious expectations about their 
interaction partner demonstrated a strong association between their initial impressions and later 
evaluations. Thus, our findings suggest that even after obtaining much richer information about 
another person through a live interaction, perceivers tend to “judge a book by its cover”. 
Although the present studies did not manipulate confederates’ physical appearance, 
several aspects of the study designs increase our confidence in the conclusions that can be drawn 
from this work. First, we measured and controlled for several factors to account for alternative 
interpretations of the findings. We showed in Study 2 that the static-live association held when 
we controlled for confederates’ attractiveness and general likeability as well as perceivers’ 
tendency to evaluate others positively. Another strength of Study 2 is its preselection procedure, 
which ensured that the confederates interacted with both participants who liked them and those 
who disliked them based on the photograph. This makes it unlikely that any one characteristic of 
a given confederate that might consistently promote liking or disliking in perceivers is driving 
the static-live association. The large number of confederates used in Study 1 also decreases the 
likelihood that the static-live association is due to characteristics of confederates and increases 
the generalizability of current findings.  
 The present research provides evidence that facial appearance plays an important role in 
evaluations based not only on photographs but also on live interactions—even unstructured 
interactions that provide many opportunities to get to know another person. Given that important 
decisions such as employment offers and graduate student admissions are very often based on 
face-to-face interviews, these findings have profound policy implications for everyday decision-
making. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 Representations of unknown others, which is our mental image of how a person with 
certain attributes (e.g., trustworthiness, dominance) looks like and acts, guide our first 
impressions upon meeting a new person. The present research sheds light on how these 
representations influence person perception and impression formation from static photographs of 
faces to actual live interactions. Stored knowledge that informs representations of unknown 
others varies in whether it is idiosyncratic (i.e., in the eye of the beholder) or shared across 
perceivers. By investigating how facial resemblance to romantic partners affects snap judgments, 
Chapter 2 (Günaydin, Zayas, Selcuk, & Hazan, 2012) addressed the idiosyncratic aspects of 
representations of unknown others that typically vary from perceiver to perceiver. Using state-of-
the-art morphing techniques to create objective facial resemblance to romantic partners, this 
research showed that unknown others whose face bore slight resemblance to one’s romantic 
partner were judged more favorably than unknown others who did not. These results held even 
when individuals were not consciously aware of the resemblance. This research is the first to 
show that objective facial resemblance to a significant other is an important idiosyncratic cue 
that influences person perception automatically, effortlessly, and without conscious awareness. 
 Although idiosyncratic cues have a profound influence on first impressions of unknown 
others, in day-to-day person perception these cues are simultaneously processed with cues that 
are largely shared across perceivers. Chapter 3 investigated how facial resemblance to known 
others (an idiosyncratic cue) and facial width-to-height ratio (WHR; a shared cue) 
simultaneously influence person perception. To bridge seemingly disparate findings in the 
literature that showed processing multiple facial cues leads to additive effects in some tasks and 
interactive effects in others, the present work made a distinction between evaluative and 
categorical judgments. The results revealed that idiosyncratic and shared cues had additive 
effects on evaluative judgments—snap judgments of unknown others—whereas these cues had 
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interactive effects on categorical judgments—judgments of whether or not unknown faces 
resemble known individuals.  
Across three studies, facial WHR was negatively associated with snap judgments of 
liking when it was simultaneously processed with facial resemblance to known others. However, 
the effect of resemblance to a known other depended on the significance of the known other.  
When unknown faces resembled newly encountered individuals, the resemblance affected 
evaluative judgments only when the newly encountered individual was described as engaging in 
blameworthy behaviors and was encountered in the exact same way (i.e., from a frontal 
viewpoint) as the physically similar unknown others. When the newly encountered individual 
was associated with positivity, even using a closeness-inducing live interaction, facial 
resemblance to this individual failed to affect snap judgments of unknown others. However, 
participants showed greater liking of unknown others when these individuals resembled their 
romantic partner (vs. not), suggesting that personal significance of the relationship influences the 
effect of the idiosyncratic cue. 
When perceivers were asked to make categorical judgments instead of evaluative 
judgments, the shared and idiosyncratic cues interacted to influence processing efficiency. 
Specifically, participants made slower and less accurate responses to wider faces resembling a 
liked known other (vs. not). This provides evidence that an idiosyncratic cue indicating 
trustworthiness (resemblance to a liked acquaintance or one’s romantic partner) is processed less 
efficiently when it is accompanied by a cue indicating untrustworthiness (a wider face). Overall, 
Chapter 3 is the first to systematically examine shared and idiosyncratic aspects of mental 
representations in the same paradigm and bridges seemingly conflicting findings in the literature 
by revealing under what conditions multiple cues lead to additive versus interactive effects.  
In the introduction (Chapter 1), I argued that shared versus idiosyncratic knowledge 
informing mental representations of unknown others can be conceptualized as a function of 
whether perceivers go through similar or different experiences. If this is indeed the case, then 
even those representations that are thought to be shared across different perceivers should be 
 
 
96 
susceptible to change through idiosyncratic experiences. Research described in Chapter 3 
showed that the negative association between facial WHR and judgments of liking was 
significantly attenuated for women who had romantic partners with wider faces. This provides 
evidence that even shared representations can be altered by having repeated idiosyncratic 
experiences that contradict these representations, suggesting that similarity of perceivers’ 
experiences is a key to understanding the shared and idiosyncratic aspects of mental 
representations. 
Although research described in Chapters 2 and 3 provided evidence that shared and 
idiosyncratic cues profoundly influence person perception, this work—along with the majority of 
research in person perception—focused on static photographs of faces (for a review see Macrae 
& Quadflieg, 2010). However, whether judgments based on photographs significantly predict 
judgments based on actual face-to-face interactions has not been previously tested. Studies 
described in Chapter 4 employed a within-participants design in which participants provided 
impressions of unknown individuals based both on photographs and on live interactions. Results 
revealed that impressions based on facial appearance judged from photographs significantly 
predicted impressions following face-to-face interactions—even when the interaction was geared 
toward getting to know the other person better. This research suggests that representations of 
facial appearance cues continue to influence impressions of unknown others even when richer 
information about these individuals is available through actual face-to-face interactions. 
Research described in the empirical chapters opens up several interesting avenues for 
future research. One direction is to study how mental representations change over time as close 
relationships form and develop (e.g., Zayas, Shoda, & Günaydin, in preparation). For example, 
how do mental representations of unknown others change as we get to know these individuals 
through repeated interactions? Reverse correlation techniques, which are used to reveal how 
individuals mentally represent various social categories (Dotsch & Todorov, 2011), are 
particularly suited to shed light on this question. For example, individuals can be asked to 
interact with an unknown other multiple times and at the end of each interaction, to judge 
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whether faces superimposed with random noise resemble the newly met acquaintance. Averaging 
across patterns of noise that participants associate with their new acquaintance would reveal how 
fledgling mental representations change over time. With repeated favorable experiences with a 
new acquaintance, the average image tapping into the representation of this person should look 
increasingly trustworthy. In contrast, if the experiences with the new acquaintance are 
unpleasant, the representation of this person should become increasingly untrustworthy.  
Reverse correlation techniques can also be used to investigate characteristics that 
distinguish mental representations of acquaintances from those of significant others. Based on 
work showing individuals tend to idealize their significant others (for a review see Gagne & 
Lydon, 2004), I would expect representations of significant others to be on average associated 
with cues indicating trustworthiness—such as resemblance to a happy facial expression—
compared to representations of acquaintances.  
Another exciting avenue for future work is to study the factors that facilitate the 
formation of significant other representations (e.g., Zayas et al., in preparation). Encountering an 
unknown other following a stressful (vs. non-stressful) experience (e.g., Beckes, Simpson, & 
Erickson, 2010) can lead to forming a favorable representation of the person given that stress-
alleviation is an important function of close relationships (e.g., Selcuk, Zayas, Günaydin, Hazan, 
& Kross, 2012). Moreover, interactions involving mutual self-disclosures can lead to having 
favorable representations of newly met acquaintances (e.g., Aron, Melinat, Aron, Vallone, & 
Bator, 1997). Factors conducive to initial attraction such as similarity, familiarity, and reciprocity 
(for a review see Günaydin, Selcuk, & Hazan, in press) can also lead to forming a favorable 
representation of a newly encountered person. Hence, an interesting avenue for future work is to 
systematically investigate how these factors influence newly formed representations. By drawing 
on theory and research in social and cognitive psychology, research addressing these questions 
will shed light on how mental representations shape interpersonal cognition and behavior at 
various stages of relationship formation and development. 
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